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What if Europe Held an Election and
No One Cared?
David Schleicher*
Last June's European Parliament ("EP") election was widely considered a failure. Turnout was low
across Europe, and, as has been the case in every EP election since they were introduced in 1979, voters
responded exclusively to domestic cues in deciding how to fill the European Union's only directly elected
body. Campaigns were waged entirely on domestic issues outside of the purview of the EP, and the popular-
ity of domestic prime ministers, who were not on the ballot, was the most important factor in determining
the results. The EP is supposed to provide a popular check on the other legislative bodies in the European
Union ("EU"), which are either appointed or directly controlled by member state governments, and thereby
reduce the EU's "democratic deficit." Instead, the failure of EP elections to generate popular feedback on
EU policy allows the deficit to fester and undermines the separation of powers inside the EU.
This paper argues that the problems of EP elections are much like the problems in a variety of American
state and local elections. Election laws ensure that national parties are on the ballot, and both legal
limitations and strategic considerations make it difficult for these national parties to develop separate
localized identities, or in the case of EP elections, Europeanized ones. Rationally ignorant voters who know
little about the individual figures in these European bodies rely on the party heuristic that is available on
the ballot, as it is the only relevant information that they have. Moreover, they do so even though it is
unclear how closely preferences on European or local policies track preferences about national issues. The
result is that national party preference ends up being reflected in these elections, despite the fact that the
winners will decide policies at another level of government. Put another way, there is a "mismatch"
between the institutional role the EP is asked to play in the EU's separation of powers-the voice of
European citizens about EU policies-and the level of party competition at which EP elections are
contested.
Mismatch problems are endemic in federal systems and are generated by constitutional structures that ask
more of voters than they are capable of providing. However, they can be solved or at least mitigated with
election law tools. Following a procedure used in a variety of developing countries, the EU could pass a
law that the EP will only seat members from those parties that both won seats from a given EU country
and received a certain percentage of the vote in a quarter of EU member states. This would force the
coalitions formed in the EP-the so-called "Euro-parties"--onto EP ballots, as parties would need to
contest elections across Europe. Voters thus would have access to a European rather than national heuristic
on the EP ballot, which would better allow them to use these elections to express preferences about EU
policy.
INTRODUCTION
Elections were held for the European Parliament ("EP")-the only di-
rectly elected body in the European Union ("EU")-in June 2009, but you
can forgive yourself if you missed them. Despite an unprecedented EU-
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funded media campaign to spur turnout, substantial doubt surrounding the
future of EU institutional reform, and an enormous economic downturn,
European voters barely registered that this election was taking place.' Turn-
out hit an all-time low, and the widespread lack of interest allowed parties
from the nationalist, xenophobic, and just strange fringes of European polit-
ics to win seats. 2 Furthermore, the actual behavior of the Members of Euro-
pean Parliament ("MEPs") had little to do with the results. Instead, as they
have in every EP election since the first in 1979, voters responded exclu-
sively to domestic cues, with the elections turning almost solely on the pop-
ularity of domestic prime ministers and parties.' In most voters' eyes, June's
EP elections did not play a role greater than a midterm public opinion poll
about people not on the ballot, despite the fact that these elections deter-
mined the composition of an increasingly powerful body inside the EU.
It was not supposed to be like this.
In 1979, with great fanfare, European voters were granted the power to
directly elect their representatives for the EP.4 In several successive treaties
revising the institutional structure of the EU since then, the EP has been
given new and stronger powers, making it a major player in the EU's legis-
lative process and leaving it only slightly weaker than the Council of the
European Union, the legislative body in which member states of the EU
1. See, e.g., Marketa Hulpachovd, Voters Still Unclear on EU Issues, PRAGUE PosT, June 3, 2009, at 1
(describing election campaigns); Alain Lamassoure, Continuation of the European Adventure Relies on Ireland,
IRISH TIMES, Dec. 10, 2008, at 18 (describing doubt about the future of EU reforms following Irish
rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon); Martin Wolf, This Crisis is a Moment, but is it a Defining One?, FIN.
TIMES, May 19, 2009, available at http://www.fullermoney.com/content/2009-05-20/FTThisCrisisIsA
MomentBulsIcADefiningOne20MayO9.pdf ("Europe ... is not having a good crisis.").
2. Total turnout was forty-three percent, far lower than the turnout for domestic elections, and a
number that overstates actual interest since it includes turnout numbers from countries where voting is
mandatory. See, e.g., David Charter & Rory Watson, European Elections: Extremist and Fringe Parties are the
Big Winners, TIMEs (U.K.), June 8, 2009, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/
elections/article6452090.ece (discussing turnout); Jonathan Eyal, EU Parliament on Fringe of Lunaty;
Newly Elected Rightist and Extremist Parties Have Little Clout but Could Undermine Unity, STRAITS TIMES
(Sing.), June 14, 2009 (describing success of xenophobic, nationalist, and odd parties like the Pirate
Party of Sweden); Swing Low, Swing Right; The European Elections, ECONOMIsT, June 13, 2009 (discussing
turnout and results) [hereinafter Swing Low, Swing Right); Trouble at the Polls; The Worrying European
Elections, EcoNoMIsT, June 13, 2009 (highlighting the success of xenophobic, nationalist, and odd parties
like the Pirate Party of Sweden).
3. A model created by three leading European political scientists using national party preferences as
its central variable predicted ninety percent of the seats won in the 2009 elections. Simon Hix, Michael
Marsh & Nick Vivyan, Burson-Marsteller, Predict '09, June 8, 2009, http://www.webarchive.org.uk/
wayback/archive/20090609081906/predict09.eu/defaulten-us.aspx. Following the first EP election in
1980, Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt first diagnosed EP elections as "second-order elections," or
elections with results determined entirely by national party popularity. See Karlheinz Reif & Hermann
Schmitt, Nine Second-Order Nation Elections-A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election
Results, 8 EUR. J. POL. RESEARCH 3, 8 (1980). This result has held up in studies of each EP election since
1979. See SIMoN Hix, WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION & How To Fix IT 80-84 (2008)
{hereinafter Hix, WHAT'S WRONG); Michael Marsh, Testing the Second-Order Election Model After Four
European Elections, 28 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 591, 606-07 (1999).
4. See SIMON Hix, ABDUL G. NOURY & GERARD ROLAND, DEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT 13 (2007) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIC POLITICS).
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vote directly.5 The EP is now one of the world's most powerful directly-
elected legislative bodies, having the power to reject, amend, and veto legis-
lation that governs an economic area larger than the United States.6 This
process continues; the newly-enacted Treaty of Lisbon further extended the
EP's powers, making it a true legislative lower house-a House of Repre-
sentatives to the Council's Senate.7
The reason why EU leaders have repeatedly increased the powers of the
EP is clear. Giving power to a directly-elected body was considered a way to
cure the "democratic deficit," or the perceived inability of European citizens
to influence EU decisionmaking. 8 The EP is supposed to provide a popular
counterweight to both the member-state controlled Council and the power-
ful European Commission, an appointed body that is intentionally some-
what removed from popular and national political pressures and that serves
primarily as the executive branch of the EU, while also exercising important
legislative functions.9 Popular elections to an increasingly powerful EP were
supposed to provide European voters a direct and important role in the EU's
separation of powers.10
These direct elections, however, have never captured the attention of the
European populace. Voter turnout in EP elections has fallen in each election
since 1979 and is far lower than turnout in domestic elections." More pres-
singly, it has become what amounts to a social scientific fact that these
elections are not responsive to anything actually done by the EP. Instead, EP
5. See infra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 50 and accompanying text; see also Bruce Stokes, U.S. Economic Hegemony Ebbs, 40
NAT'L J. 17, 17 (2008) (noting that EU formed a larger single market than the United States).
7. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007, O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]; Dan Bilefsky
& Steven Castle, Way is Clear to Centralize Europe's Power, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 2009, at A6; C6lia
Sampol, Lisbon Treaty: Lisbon Will Strengthen Parliament's Powers, EUROPOLITICS (June 29, 2009),
htrp://www.europolitics.info/lisbon-will-strengthen-parliament-s-powers-artr241126-32.html. The anal-
ogy does not hold perfectly. First, member state governments vote directly in the Council, making state
control over the Council far greater than U.S. state control over the Senate, even before the Seventeenth
Amendment provided for direct elections. Second, voting is weighted by population in the Council,
unlike the equal representation given to states in the U.S. Senate. See Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member
State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1612, 1626, 1689 (2002).
8. David Marquand coined the term "democratic deficit," arguing that an elected and powerful Euro-
pean Parliament would be necessary if the rule requiring unanimity among democratically responsive
member states in the Council were removed (as it has been). DAVID MARQUAND, PARLIAMENT FOR
EUROPE 64-66 (1979). For a discussion of efforts to increase the power of the EP as a solution for the
democratic deficit, see Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character ofSuprana-
tionalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 673-74 (1999).
9. See Young, supra note 7, at 1696-97. Members of the Commission are appointed by the Council,
but the governing treaty of the EU is clear that the Commissioners should function independently and
without influence from member states. Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the
European Union arts. 244-45, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU}.
10. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
11. Martias Kumm, To Be a European Citizen? The Absence of Constitutional Patriotism and the Constitu-
tional Treaty, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 481, 512 (2005) (citing voter turnout figures in 2004 EP elections
and comparing them to previous EP election turnout and domestic turnout).
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elections are "second-order": national politics determine the results of these
supra-national elections.12 As political scientist Simon Hix has noted, "The
problem is that European Parliament elections actually have very little to do
with 'Europe!' . . . Instead, voters, the media, and national parties treat
European Parliament elections as just another set of domestic elections,
where the dominant issue is how well national governments have
performed. "13
Despite the absence of democratic pedigree or retrospective check on their
behavior, something odd happens when MEPs arrive in Strasbourg.' 4 In
elections for the EP, voters choose between domestic parties listed on the
ballot-Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats in Britain; the
UMP and the Parti Socialiste in France.' 5 But once elected, MEPs join coali-
tions of likeminded national parties, forming supra-national parties such as
the Party of European Socialists, comprised of the Labour party, the Parti
Socialiste and other center-left parties across Europe.' 6 These "Euro-parties"
are now legally separate entities, well-organized, and funded with EU
grants.' 7 Their members are also quite unified on ideological grounds-
MEP voting patterns demonstrate tight party cohesion.8
As a result, the EP looks and sounds like a democratically elected legisla-
ture, with parties organizing votes, predictable ideological splits, lobbyists
loitering in the hallways, and members making preening speeches. Yet,
there is one missing element: any semblance of democratic control. Voters
have no idea who the MEPs are, do not care about what they do, and cer-
tainly do nothing to punish their bad behavior.' 9 Voter disengagement from
the EP has ensured that the decision to give it more power failed to confer
much democratic legitimacy on the EU as a whole. In fact, polls reveal a
collapse in popular support for the EU since granting the EP real power. 2 0
12. See supra note 3.
13. Hix, WHAT'S WRONG, supra note 3, at 79.
14. Strasbourg, France is the official seat of the European Parliament, and where plenary sessions are
held. Kristin Archick & Derek E. Mix, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21998, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
8 (2010).
15. The parties listed are only meant to be illustrative of the fact that domestic parties appear on the
EP ballot. For a full list of parties and results in EP elections by country by year, see EUROPE PouTIQUE
(Oct. 3, 2010), http://www.europe-politique.eu/.
16. See SIMON Hix & CHRISTOPHER LORD, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 55-90
(1997). For a full listing of how each domestic party in Europe relates to Euro-parties in the EP, see the
European Parliament's European Election Results. Election Results: The New Parliament, EUROPEAN PAR-
uAMENT (July 16, 2009), http://www.europarl.europa.eulparliament/archivelelections2009/en/
index en.html.
17. See infra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
18. See DEMOCRATIC POLITICS, supra note 4, at 180-91.
19. See ia. at 26-29; see also Hix & LORD, supra note 16, at 55-90.
20. Hix, WHAT'S WRONG, supra note 3, at 52-53 (noting the collapse in support for the EU from late
1980s to mid 1990s); DEMOCRATIC POLITICS, supra note 4, at 14-15 (illustrating in Table 1.1 the EP's
increase of power through the introduction of the cooperation procedure in 1987, the co-decision proce-
dure in 1993, and the reform and extension of co-decision in 1999).
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With the ability to pass legislation that affects hundreds of millions of
people in an increasing number of ways, the EP is now undoubtedly an
important body-in last the last few years, they have passed legislation gov-
erning everything from carbon emissions to mobile telephony21-and it is
therefore both surprising and problematic that voters cannot be bothered to
form independent judgments about its policies. It is equally surprising that
despite the flaws of its elections, European states continue to grant the EP
more power in an effort to resolve the democratic deficit, like a nervous
gambler doubling his bets after a series of losses. This Article will argue that
EP elections fail to reflect voter preferences about EU issues because the laws
governing these elections limit, or at least do not encourage, the develop-
ment of pan-European party competition. Absent such competition, under-
informed voters simply will not use these elections to serve the goals in-
tended by the EU's institutional framers. Further, it will argue that using
the tools of election law, European elections can be fixed such that the EP
can play the role envisioned for it under the EU's current separation of
powers.
Scholars who have studied the failures of EP elections have argued that
the EU should change its broader institutional system. Some argue for re-
placing the current EU institutional framework with one in which European
elections determine the makeup of all EU institutions, in an effort to make
the elections important enough for voters to care about. Others argue that
the failures of EP elections are not really a problem at all, claiming that the
EU does not need much direct voter input.2 2 These arguments are interest-
ing, but require radical departures from the current, carefully drawn separa-
tion of powers in the EU between directly-elected, member-state
representing, and insulated bureaucratic bodies.
Instead of reforming its institutional structure, the EU should look at
changes that can affect the elections themselves. Election law and constitu-
tional law scholars have begun examining what I will call here "mismatch"
problems in American elections, where the question an election asks of vot-
ers and the tools provided by the election law system are different. 23 This is
what occurs in EP elections-voters are asked their input on EU policies but
see domestic parties on their ballots. Rather than focusing on changing the
allocation of powers between the EP, the Council, and the Commission, or
abandoning the idea that the EP should provide direct democratic feedback,
European policymakers could attempt to solve the mismatch problem by
manipulating the information on election ballots.
21. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 123-137 and accompanying text. Simon Hix and Andrew Moravcsik, whose work is
discussed below, do not actually call for treaty amendments, but rather for changes in institutional focus
by widespread elite agreement.
23. See infra notes 224-237 and accompanying text.
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It has long been known that most voters are under-informed about polit-
ics everywhere, and with good reason-any individual vote is not instru-
mentally important and the private benefits of casting an informed ballot
are even less clear.2 4 The only mechanism that saves elections from utter
incoherence is the political party. If parties stay roughly consistent in their
policies over time, voters can develop "running tallies" of whatever retro-
spective evaluations they have of different policies practiced or promised by
party members. 25 If party names appear on the ballot, voters can tie these
tallies to voting decisions, allowing even basically uninformed voters the
opportunity to provide at least some meaningful feedback. The key, though,
is for the party name to provide a clear and consistent heuristic, or informa-
tional shortcut, for voters. Accurate and consistent party labels reduce the
cost of being informed by providing a link between observations and actual
voting decisions, making it more likely that voters will cast informed
ballots.
However, where voters are provided with party heuristics on the ballot
that do not match the level at which elections are being held, reliance on
those party heuristics will not necessarily lead to informed decisionmaking.
As noted above, voters in EP elections see only domestic parties (and a few
fringe ones) on their ballot. Given how we believe voters develop and use
political knowledge, it is unsurprising that they use them to comment on
the performance of domestic parties-it is what is in front of them. The lack
of labels on the ballot that refer to voting patterns and behavior in the EP
makes it impossible for rationally ignorant voters to express preferences
about EU policy. The lack of attention to European issues and interest
among voters thus partially results from the lack of useful labels for organiz-
ing what information they do have.
What appears on an election ballot is not purely the result of competitive
political forces-ballots are legal documents and their contents reflect pub-
lic policy choices. The reason domestic parties are on the ballot as opposed
to some other set of choices is that European countries use largely the same
laws to govern EP elections as they do domestic ones.2 6 Domestic parties are
24. See ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIc THEORY OF DEMOCRACY, 207-59 (1957); Ilya Somin,
Knowledge About Ignorance: New Directions in the Study of Political Information, 18 CRITICAL REv. 255, 260-
62 (2006).
25. The "running rally" model was developed by Morris Fiorina. MORRis FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE
VOTING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONs 65-78, 193-200 (1981). This model, and other arguments that voters
use parties as shortcuts for information, have been criticized for minimizing the importance of voter
ignorance. They argue that retrospective voting models fail to acknowledge that voters credit politicians
for policies or events beyond their control, often do not know which party is in power, and treat party
affiliation more like an ethnic or religious affiliation than one based on issues. See infra notes 164 and
accompanying text. As a result, critics argue that shortcuts do not allow voters to behave as if they were
informed. These criticisms, however, are aimed at the argument that with political parties providing
heuristics, voter behavior approaches what it would be were voters fully informed. They do not suggest
that, absent political parties providing relevant heuristics, anything approaching representation of popu-
lar opinions about policies is possible.
26. See infra notes 186-188 and accompanying text.
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advantaged by these laws and have huge institutional strengths that allow
them to dominate national discussion and run candidates in EP elections.
Given the greater relative importance of national elections to these parties,
however, they have little incentive to develop separate identities for the pur-
poses of EP elections. Doing so would be risky to the stability of party
coalitions and would not permit them to claim a domestic victory following
success in EP elections.
Thus, part of the problem with EP elections is the way information is
presented to under-informed voters. With just national political parties on
the ballot, the information that these voters are given results in voting deci-
sions based on issues (i.e. national politics) that are different from those that
the EU framers wanted and expected voters to use (i.e. the actual decisions
made by the EP). This does not have to be the case: The EU could change its
election laws so that the heuristics provided to voters on the ballot correlate
to the behavior of EP politicians. Just as relevant party labels make relevant
the policy observations of relatively under-informed voters in other types of
elections, election laws that spur the development of useful party informa-
tion would serve to make for an electorate that is more informed and more
capable of playing its intended role in the EU's institutional structure.
Specifically, the EU could adopt a system similar to the one used in
Nigerian, Indonesian and Kenyan elections, which requires candidates to
receive a certain percentage of the vote in a number of states as well as
winning a certain share of the overall vote before receiving representation.
EP elections use proportional representation, and under the laws of most
member states, a party has to receive more than a threshold amount-usu-
ally five percent-in any given member state in order to have members
elected to the EP from that country.27 Under this proposal, there would be a
double threshold. In order for a party to get an MEP elected from any mem-
ber state, the party would have to: (1) receive a certain percentage in the
member state; and (2) receive a certain percentage in a set number of other
EU member states. For instance, in order to receive representation in the
French delegation to the EP, a party would have to receive, say, five percent
of the French vote, and three percent of the vote in at least seven other EU
member states. 28
This rule would force parties to appear on the ballot under the same name
in many countries. The likely result would be that the coalitions in the EP
to which these parties belong-the Euro-parties-would be chosen to ap-
pear on the ballot in each country. 29 French voters would see on their EP
27. See infra notes 211-213 and accompanying text.
28. The numbers here are not chosen at random-they directly mirror the standards that Euro-parties
have to meet to receive funding from the EU. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
29. That these parties already exist, with legal identities, funding sources, and staff, should reduce the
difficulties of establishing new international organizations. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
Nothing about a distribution requirement actually necessitates substantive changes in the organization of
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ballots the Party of European Socialists and the European People's Party
instead of the Parti Socialiste and the UMP. Voters would thus have a ballot
notation that permits them to link observations of the behavior of MEPs to
voting decisions in a low cost way. To the extent that voters notice decisions
made by this increasingly powerful body, this would allow them to develop
running tallies that would translate those observations into informed votes.
Importantly, this proposal only seeks to change EP elections to help the
EP serve its institutional function. It is not an effort to engage in a broader
reform of the EU. The proposed rule would not affect the power of the EU
vis-a-vis the member states. It would have no effect on member state domes-
tic elections and hence would not change the politics of the Council or the
Commission. It would not even necessarily reduce the influence of domestic
parties over the Euro-parties, which could still be governed by whatever
internal rules they saw fit. All it would change is the notation on EP ballots.
However, this minor change would give voters a better idea of the policies
for which they are voting, changing the competitive dynamics of EP elec-
tions. Further, it would allow the Euro-party brands to develop identities
separate from those of their domestic partners. By giving voters better infor-
mation, this change would create a way for EP elections to be about the EU,
allowing the EP to play its intended role in the EU's institutional system.
Now, it is quite possible that this would not work entirely as intended.
Voters may still use domestic party support as their sole criterion for their
vote even after the rule is enacted. This would still be the case, for example,
if it turns out that voters cannot keep two separate party systems in their
head at the same time.3 0 However, even if this reform proposal does not
work as intended, it would be an improvement over the status quo. At the
very least, it would limit the ability of candidates to make purely nationalis-
tic appeals that would be unpopular in other countries, as candidates from a
Euro-party in one country could be held accountable for statements of their
co-partisans in another country. Further, it would provide some useful infor-
mation to voters. These effects would be beneficial, even if the proposed
reform did not completely resolve the problem of voter information in EP
elections.
Of course, properly understanding what is wrong with the EP is itself
important, but the claims in this Article have a broader reach. The problems
of EP elections are basically the same as the problems in a variety of Ameri-
can local and state elections. Voters in these elections use their national
the national political parties that join together to form the Euro-parties. Parties would only need to
change the label that appears on the ballot.
30. F. Scott Fitzgerald famously noted that "the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold
two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function." F. Scor
FITZGERALD, THE CRACK-UP (1936), available at http://www.esquire.com/features/the-crack-up. It is
thus a real question whether an ordinary electorate could hold two separate, but not opposed ideas about
two separate sets of political parties. For some evidence that voters in one place can develop preferences in
two different party systems, see infra notes 219-221 and accompanying text.
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party preferences to determine their vote, even when those preferences only
weakly correspond to policy preferences at the state or local level." They do
so because of their general lack of information about politics and the way
that ballots provide information. These "mismatch" problems are endemic
in federal systems, and thinking about them systematically will be a boon to
future constitutional framers. Understanding the range of possible re-
sponses-election law changes like the ones suggested here are far from the
only option-will provide a toolbox for solving these problems when they
do arise.
Finally, looking at mismatch problems has important implications for
election law scholarship. While election law scholars have studied virtually
every aspect of ballot access rules, laws governing political party members,
and methods of vote counting, one effect of election law has largely been
ignored: the degree to which election law serves to educate a poorly in-
formed populace. 32 The political science scholarship on how voters form po-
litical opinions shows that the subjects of election law (for example, who
gets on the ballot, how internally consistent political parties are, etc.) are
central to how voters process political information and how voting decisions
are made.33 In addition to its other roles, election law serves as a public
good, providing tools to voters that improve social welfare, which are not
provided for by naturally occurring political markets.34 This Article sug-
gests how these public goods can be delivered in a better way. In order to
understand the full ramifications of virtually any election law decision, how-
ever, scholars need to consider the effects it has on the information easily
accessible to voters.
1. THE SOLUTIONS AND PROBLEMS OF ASSIGNING POWER TO A
POPULARLY ELECTED EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
This section will provide a brief history of the EP, how European leaders
envisioned it would work, and the evolution of EP elections. It will establish
that problems with EP elections have frustrated the institutional goals be-
hind the repeated decisions to increase the power of the EP over the last
thirty years.
31. See David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections? The Role of
Election Law, 23 J. L. & PoL. 419, 437-47 (2007) [hereinafter Schleicher, City Council Elections]; see also
infra notes 224-232.
32. For two excellent reviews of the modern field of election law, see Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy
and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 601 (2007), and Guy-Uriel E. CharlesJudging the Law of Politics, 103
MicH. L. REv. 1099, 1131-40 (2005).
33. See infra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 238-241 and accompanying text.
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A. The European Parliament as a solution: bringing a popular voice on
European issues into the separation of powers in the European Union
The current EU institutions did not spring fully formed, Athena-like,
from the foreheads of Europe's post-war leaders. Rather, they developed over
time in a series of treaties created to enhance the EU's capacity, to further
European integration, and to solve the many problems inherent in building
an institution that is unique in the world-somewhat more than an interna-
tional organization but less than a state." The history of the EU's develop-
ment is an oft-told tale, and I will not repeat that story here. However, it is
important to provide a brief history of one of its core institutions: the Euro-
pean Parliament.
At the establishment of the European Economic Community (the precur-
sor to the EU) in 1957, legislative and executive power was divided between
two entities.3 6 The first was the European Commission, a multinational
body with the power to propose legislation and regulations, with member-
ship selected and provided by each of the member states, and with a Chair or
President selected by European heads of state.37 The Commission, effectively
a collection of top technocrats and senior politicians, served as the executive
body of the EU, responsible for all regulations and administration., The
other important entity was the European Council, in which each member
state was represented.39 The Council approved legislation and major poli-
cies. 40 There was also an odd entity created known as the European Parlia-
ment (although it was not formally given this name until 1985).4 Although
the Treaty of Rome (the document that established the European Economic
Community's institutional structure) assumed that this body would eventu-
ally be directly elected, it was not at first. Instead, it was composed of dele-
gates from national parliaments. 42 It had only two limited powers-the
right to be consulted about legislation pending before the Commission and
35. For an abbreviated history of this lurching development, see DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., EURO-
PEAN UNION LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 8-43 (2006).
36. See Hon. John P. Flaherty & Maureen E. Lally-Green, The European Union: Where is it Now, 34
DuQ. L. REv. 923, 933-36 (1996) (describing the power and make-up of the institutions of the EEC
from 1958-1985).
37. Id. at 933. It should be noted that the Commission did not take its full form until 1967, although
it existed in large part following the Treaty of Rome. See Nicholas P. Zalany, The European Union Constitu-
tion and its Effects on Federalism in the EU, 66 Om14o ST. L.J. 615, 620 (2005).
38. See Young, supra note 7, at 1628.
39. See Flaherty & Lally-Green, supra note 36, at 941-42. It is a distinct body from the Council of
Europe, an entity in which heads of state from Europe meet to chart the long-run goals of the EU. Id.
40. The Council voted by unanimity at the outset, but since the Single European Treaty of 1986, it
has used "qualified-majority voting" on some issues, where larger states are given more votes and there is
a need to get supermajorities across more than one dimension. SIMON Hix, THE POUTICAI. SYSTEM OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION 83-89 (2d ed. 2005) thereinafter THE POLITICAL SYSTEM). The Council also has
quasi-executive functions that fall somewhere between legislative monitoring of the executive and actual
implementation of legislation. Id. at 35-38, 52-58.
41. See DEMOCRATIC POLITICS, supra note 4, at 12.
42. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 138(3), Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11; see also Flaherty & Lally-Green, supra note 36, at 941-42.
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the right to censure the Commission by a double majority vote (a majority
of all members of parliament as well as two thirds of those voting).4 3
From 1958 through 1979, the EP's power slowly increased, notably gain-
ing the ability to amend the EU's budget in certain ways.4 4 In 1979, how-
ever, the EP was dramatically reformed by the institution of direct
elections. 45 Successive treaties following 1979 increased the power of the EP
in order to match the institutional legitimacy that came with its status as
the only directly elected body in the EU. This power has come in two forms:
legislative responsibility and control over the executive branch, the Euro-
pean Commission.
The EP was first given substantial legislative responsibility in the late
1980s. In the 1987 Single European Act, it gained the power to propose
amendments and to delay the passage of legislation through the so-called
"co-operation procedure."4 6 True legislative power arrived in 1993, when
the Maastricht Treaty assigned to the EP the power of "co-decision."4  Al-
though the Commission still has the exclusive right to propose new legisla-
tion, legislation in policy areas covered by co-decision (originally a limited
swath of the EU's overall portfolio) must be approved by the EP as well as
by the Council.48 When there are disagreements between the Council and
the EP, an ad hoc conciliation committee is formed, consisting of an equal
number of representatives from both bodies. The differences are then hashed
out, similar to the operation of conference committees in the U.S. Congress.
Both bodies must pass the final legislation. That is to say, Maastricht, and
subsequent changes made in the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty, transformed the
EP into a body comparable to a lower legislative house. 49
43. See DEMOCRATIC POLITICS, supra note 4, at 14.
44. Id.
45. See Flaherty & Lally-Green, supra note 36, at 941-42.
46. Single European Act art. 149(2), Nov. 10, 1987, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1 [hereinafter Single Euro-
pean Act]. This gave the Parliament the power to propose amendments and to delay the passage of
legislation. See DEMOCRATIC POLITICS, supra note 4, at 14, 19; Lindseth, supra note 8, at 673.
47. Treaty on European Union art. 189(b), Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191). In areas covered by co-deci-
sion, all legislation must be approved by the EP as well as by the Council. See Michael H. Abbey &
Nicholas Bromfield, A Practitioner's Guide to the Maastricht Treaty, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1329, 1350-51
(1994); Note, Environmental Effects of Codecision Under the Maastricht Treaty, 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 247, 252-54 (1999) (hereinafter Environmental Effects].
48. See Abbey & Bromfield, supra note 47, at 1350-51; Environmental Effects, supra note 47, at 247,
252-54.
49. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the bodies were not true equals even in those areas covered by co-
decision. Where the EP and Council could not agree, the Council was empowered to propose a version of
legislation that could not be amended by the EP-it had to vote up or down. Because the EP tended to
vote yes on legislation when given this "rake it or leave it" choice, its power to truly effect legislation
was limited. Some argued that introducing co-decision without the power to propose amendments actu-
ally weakened the EP. See, e.g., George Tsebelis, Maastricht and the Democratic Deficit, in DECISION RULES
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 16, 17 (P. Moser, G. Schneider & G.
Kirchgaessner eds., 2000). However, in 1999, following a decision by the EP to vote no on a Council-
proposed piece of legislation on voice telephony, the Amsterdam Treaty removed this structural advan-
tage for the Council. "The Parliament is now a powerful legislator, coequal with the Council under the
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These changes turned the EP into a central player in the EU's legislative
process. In the last EP term (2004-2009), it was particularly active in sin-
gle-market and environmental legislation-both of which effectively regu-
late all European businesses-rendering it one of the world's most powerful
economic regulators.50 From the regulation of all service providers in the EU
to an expansion of a cap-and-trade carbon emissions system, the EP has
played a major role in determining how liberal, how harmonized, and how
green European policy is.
The EP has also made its presence felt through its power to reject ap-
pointments to the European Commission. The Council nominates the Presi-
dent of the Commission, who, in consultation with member states, selects
the rest of the Commission and assigns each Commissioner her portfolio in
the Commission's cabinet-like system." The Maastricht Treaty expanded
the EP's control over the selection of the Commission, effectively granting it
the power to vote up or down the appointment of the Commission President
(a power formalized in 1999).12 The EP also retained a power it had held
since the outset of the EU: the ability to censure or effectively remove the
Commission by double majority vote. 3 In 1990, the threat of censure suc-
ceeded in provoking the resignation of the Jacques Santer-led Commission,
following an EP report alleging corruption and nepotism. 4 The full realiza-
tion of the EP's power over the Commission, however, was not felt until
2004, when it initially vetoed the newly-appointed Commission and forced
the resignation of Justice and Civil Liberties Commissioner Rocco Buttig-
lione, a conservative Italian politician who declared that homosexuality was
a sin." The EP now has substantial control over the appointment of the
President of the Commission, the choice of Commissioners, and the ability
to remove the Commission in the case of misconduct.
The proposed EU Constitution would have made the Parliament even
more powerful, expanding co-decision to all policy areas and granting the
EP greater control over the EU budget. 6 Although the Constitution was
rejected by voters in several European countries, the substantive changes it
reformed codecision procedure." George Tsebelis & Geoffrey Garrett, The Institutional Foundations of In-
tergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union, 55 INT'L ORG. 357, 359 (2001).
50. See At a Glance: Key EU Laws, BBC NEWS (May 12, 2009, 12:04 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hileurope/7959853.stm
51. See THE PoLITICAL SYSTEM, supra note 40, at 41-43, 59-60. Until 1994, member states nomi-
nated the President of the Commission by unanimity, but the Council has done so by qualified majority
votes since 1993. Id. at 59, 61.
52. See CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 35, at 116-17; DEMOCRATIC POLITICS, Supra note 4, at 14; THE
POuTICAL SYSTEM, supra note 40, at 59-60.
53. See DEMOCRATIC POLITICS, supra note 4, at 13-17.
54. See THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, supra note 40, at 60-61.
55. See David Gow, Grateful Barroso Offers MEPs a Say on EU Reform, GUARDIAN (UK), Nov.19, 2004,
at 21; see also DEMOCRATIC POLITICs, supra note 4, at 1-3.
56. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. 1-19-20, Dec. 16, 2004, O.J. (C 310) [herein-
after Establishing Treaty); see also Stephen C. Sieberson, The Proposed E.U. Constitution-Will it Eliminate
the EU's Democratic Deficit?, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 173, 208-09 (2004).
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proposed to the EP's power (like much of the rest of the Constitution) were
included in the Reform Treaty, or the Treaty of Lisbon. 7 After Irish voters
agreed to the Treaty in the second referendum on the subject (they rejected
it the first time it was up for consideration), it was ratified by all European
states in November 2009.58 The Reform Treaty expanded the EP's control
over the EU budget, rebranded the co-decision process as the "ordinary leg-
islative procedure," and expanded co-decision to cover agriculture and virtu-
ally all other areas of EU policy competence.59 This too brief history should
make two things clear: first, that the EP's power has repeatedly increased
between 1979 and 2009; and second, that the EP is now a very important
institution, with direct control over legislation affecting hundreds of mil-
lions of people and billions of dollars of business and, through its power over
nominations to the Commission, influence over all aspects of EU policy.
There is little question why the power and influence of the EP has been
increased. As the EU developed, it gradually took responsibility over an
increasing number of areas from member-state governments. Furthermore,
successive treaties limited the ability of the democratically elected govern-
ments of member states to veto legislative action in the Council, as it moved
in the majority of policy areas from a unanimity voting rule to "Qualified
Majority Voting," a system in which a super-majority of votes is needed and
the weight of each country's vote is determined by its population.6 0 In re-
sponse, some politicians and scholars have developed a clear and deadly cri-
tique of its institutional apparatus: the EU was making policy that affected
people's lives with little direct democratic input. 61 In David Marquand's
classic term, the EU suffered from a "democratic deficit"-it was increas-
ingly powerful, but its legitimacy was undercut by how removed its deci-
sions were from the people of Europe. 62 While the Commission served as a
bureaucratic enforcer of common European interests and the Council served
to protect the interests of member states, there was no tribune through
which the voice of the people could be heard directly.
Giving power to the Parliament has been the EU's regular response to
arguments that it has become too bureaucratic, too decentralized, or insuffi-
57. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 7; see also Bilefsky & Castle, supra note 7; Youri Devuyst, The European
Union's Institutional Balance After the Treaty of Lisbon: "Community Method" and "Democratic Deficit" Reas-
sessed, 39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 247, 306-09 (2008) (describing power of EP after Treaty of Lisbon); Valery
Giscard D'Estaing, The Treaty is the Same as the Constitution, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Oct. 30, 2007, available
at http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/valeacutery-giscard-destaing-he-eu-treaty-is-
the-same-as-the-constitution-398286.html.
58. Q&A: The Lisbon Treaty, BBC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2010, 16:47 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2hi/
europe/6901353.stm.
59. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 7 (showing that changes made are spread across many articles); see also
Devuyst, supra note 57, at 306-09.
60. See Hix, WHAT'S WRONG, supra note 3, at 4, 19 ("[Qualified Majority Voting] in the Council
now covers all the main areas relating to the creation and reform of the internal market"); see also THE
POuTICAL SYSTEM, supra note 40, at 67-89.
61. Lindseth, supra note 8, at 673-74.
62. MARQUAND, sffra note 8, at 64-65.
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ciently democratic.6 3 However, it is important to note that giving power to
the EP was supposed to be an incremental change. The EP is an additional
check in the EU's complex system of checks and balances, a counterweight
to the technocratic impulses of the Commission and the centripetal nature of
the Council. In 1978, a key EP official described the role European leaders
had envisioned for the Parliament after direct elections:
With the Commission representing the Community interest, and
the Council the national interests, it is just as well that the Parlia-
ment exists as a balancing element . . . the elected Parliament will
receive its mandate directly from the peoples of the Community.
It will be independent and autonomous with respect both to gov-
ernments and states, deriving its legitimacy from the popular
vote."
Although the EP was just one piece of the broader EU puzzle, it was seen
as an increasingly important one, as the EU's ever-expanding reach into new
policy areas generated extreme pressure for it to resolve the "democratic
deficit."65 The EU's current institutional structure is premised on the theory
that the EP will serve as a popular counterweight to the bureaucratic Com-
mission and the member-state run Council. Further, the member states and
European leaders generally have considered enhancing the EP's role as a nec-
essary component of enhancing the EU's legitimacy, based on the theory
that giving more power to a directly-elected body will reduce the "demo-
cratic deficit." Both of these, however, are just theories. And, as will be
discussed in the next section, there are reasons to doubt that either is true.
B. European Parliament elections as a problem: European Parliament elections
track preferences about domestic policies and not European Union polices
As discussed in the previous section, what makes the EP different from
other EU institutions is the fact that its members are directly elected, and it
is this fact that has spurred EU leaders to assign the EP more and more
power over the last thirty years. As a directly elected body, the EP is sup-
posed to provide a perspective on EU policy different from those offered by
the bureaucratic Commission and the member-state run Council. Thus, the
63. See Young, supra note 7, at 1697 ("The primary response to concerns about a 'democratic deficit'
has been a call to enhance the role of the European Parliament-the only directly elected institution in
the Community system.").
64. Jean-Joseph Schwed, The Parliament and the Commission, 440 ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC.
33, 34 (1978).
65. "The official strategy here has centered on a further increase in the role of the Community's
elected body, the European Parliament-in effect, to make it the legitimate political superior in the
community system. According to the European Court of Justice, the growing importance of the Parlia-
ment is an expression of 'the fundamental democratic principle that the people should take part in the
exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative assembly."' Lindseth, supra note 8, at 673
(quoting Case 138/79, SA Roquette Freres v. Council, 1980 E.C.R. 3333, 3360 1 33).
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success of the EP in fulfilling its institutional role turns on the quality and
type of elections.
When elections for the EP were first announced in 1979, European lead-
ers either expected or hoped that mass pan-European political parties would
develop and push integration along, a popular political response to the fact
that power had shifted from member states to the EU.66 This sentiment has
become part of the EU's central document. The Treaty on the European
Union states: "Political parties at European level contribute to forming Eu-
ropean political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the
Union." 67 Pan-European parties were seen as an inevitable reaction to the
establishment of a pan-European legislature, and their development would
be key to its success.
Suffice to say, this did not come to pass. The major domestic parties in
each country dominated elections in 1979, and have done so in every elec-
tion since.68 Only the Green Party has ever won a seat in more than one
country, and it is debatable whether to classify it as a pan-European party or
a collection of related domestic parties.6 9 Other parties that have attempted
a pan-European presence have failed to win substantial support. For in-
stance, in the 2009 election, anti-European leader Declan Ganley, the bil-
lionaire who successfully led the "No" campaign against the first Treaty of
Lisbon referendum in Ireland, founded a new political party, Libertas, that
ran candidates for the EP across Europe. 70 Nevertheless, Libertas only won
one seat throughout the EU, and Ganley went down to defeat in Ireland.
Furthermore, major domestic parties largely contest these elections in their
own names, with no reference to their Euro-party affiliations.7 '
66. See Hix & LORD, supra note 16, at 12-16; DEMOCRATIC POLITICS, supra note 4, at 51; David
Marquand, Towards a Europe of the Parties, 49 POL. Q. 425, 445 (1978) (arguing Europe could only move
beyond its present as a "Europe des patries," in Charles de Gaulle's famous formulation, if it become a
"Europe des parris.").
67. Stephen Day & Jo Shaw, Developing Political Parties in the European Union: Towards a European Party
Statute?, in PARTY FUNDING AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 293 (K.D.
Ewing & Samuel Issacharoff eds., 1993).
68. See DEMOCRATIC POLITICS , supra note 4, at 51.
69. In 2004, a variety of disparate national Green parties formed the European Green Party. They did
so to contest the 2004 European Parliament elections with a common platform. See Peter Ford, Greens
Seek Pan-European Political Clout, CHRISTIAN Sa. MONITOR, Mar. 1, 2004, at 6; History, THE GREENS I
EUROPEAN FREE ALLIANCE IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.greens-efa.org/cms/default/
rubrik/6/6648.history.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).
70. See Swing Low, Swing Right, supra note 2.
71. See Hix & LORD, supra note 16, at 15 ("national parties ... monopolise the mass political arena
.... ); Michael Marsh & Mark Franklin, The Foundations: Unanswered Questions from the Study of European
Elections, 1979-1994, in CHOOSING EUROPE? THE EUROPEAN ELECTORATE AND NATIONAL POuTICS IN
THE FACE OF UNION 20 (Cees van der Eijk & Mark Franklin eds., 1996). There are a few exceptions to
this-for instance, the Irish party Fine Gael has used its membership in the European People's Party in
its campaign literature. Marsh & Franklin, supra, at 20.
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Candidates for the EP range from non-descript party politicians to nota-
ble national celebrities, but are usually not major politicians. 72 Under EU
law, member states must now use proportional representation or a single
transferable vote system to fill their EP seats.7 3 Domestic parties choose the
list of candidates, and their selections are often criticized for being based
more on the desire to give sinecures to faithful party supporters and ex-
politicians than on any plan to choose popular candidates who can lead cam-
paigns.7 4 When well-known politicians run for EP seats, it is usually because
they have become political liabilities in domestic politics. For example,
Rachinda Dati, a former Justice Minister in France, ran to become an MEP
in 2009 after a rocky period in the French government.75 Moreover, when
candidates are well-known, it is often not for their political successes. Candi-
date lists for the EP frequently feature celebrities. In 2009, candidates in-
cluded a Prince from the House of Savoy, Lithuania's leading talk show host,
a Finish rally car driver, and "Romania's Paris Hilton."7 6 This trend reached
its apex in Italy, when Silvio Berlusconi selected a group of female celebri-
ties with no political experience-including a former reality television star,
a soap opera actress, and a beauty pageant winner-to run as EP candidates
for his People of Liberty Party, withdrawing his support only after his wife
called the candidates "shameless rubbish" chosen solely for their looks.7 7
Despite the inclusion of these celebrities, turnout in EP elections is con-
tinuously relatively low. 78 After the first EP election in 1979, when sixty-
72. See An Unloved Parliament, ECONOMIST, May 9, 2009, at 56 ("Leaders decry the practice of packing
the European Parliament with failed politicians and cronies"); Shaken in Strasbourg, ECONOMIST, January
16, 1999, at 18.
73. Council Decision of 25 June and 23 September 2002, 2002/772/EC, Amending the Act Concern-
ing the Election of the Representatives of the European Parliament by Direct Universal Suffrage, An-
nexed to Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom, 2002 O.J. (L 283) 1 (hereinafter Euratom Treaty].
74. See Simon Hix, Parliamentary Behavior with Two Principals: Preferences, Parties, and Voting in the
European Parliament, 46 Am. J. POL. Sci. 688, 691 (2002) (national parties choose candidate lists);
Charlemagne, Record Abstention in Euro-elections, EcoNoMisT CHARLEMAGNE'S NOTEBOOK, (June 8,
2009, 0:21), http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2009/06/record abstention-in euroelect.
cfm; An Unloved Parliament, supra note 72, at 18 ("Leaders decry the practice of packing the European
Parliament with failed politicians and cronies.").
75. Matthew Saltmarch, What Next for a French Meteor?, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 11, 2009, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/0
6
/11/world/europe/l 1ihtdati.html?_r= 1&scp= l&sq=%22What%
20next%2Ofor%20a%2OFrench%20meteor%22&st=cse; See An Unloved Parliament, supra note 72, at 18.
A similar story can be told about former French Prime Minister Michael Rocard. See Sarkozy's Moment:
France's Reshuffled Government, EcoNoMisT, Apr. 3, 2004 (noting that Rocard was dismissed as Prime
Minister due to his unpopularity); Jeffrey Ulbrich, Washed-Up Windbags, HOBART MERCURY (Austl.),
Apr. 22, 1996 (noting that Rocard was only one among many "big names and fading stars" in the EP).












702973337; Peter Popham, The Last Days of the Court of King Silvio, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), June 27,
2009, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-last-days-of-the-court-of-king-
silvio-1721558.html.
78. It is theoretically possible that the inclusion of less than serious candidates drives turnout down,
rather than up. If there were gains from running ordinary politicians, however, we would expect the
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three percent of European voters voted, turnout has continuously fallen.7 9
Approximately twenty percentage points lower than the average turnout in
national elections, it dropped to under fifty percent participation for the first
time in 2004 and was only at forty-three percent in 2009.80 Moreover, this
actually overstates the actual enthusiasm for voting in EP elections, as it
includes data from countries, such as Belgium, where voting is mandatory,
and countries that held simultaneous local elections."' The turnout was par-
ticularly low in some member states-under twenty percent in Slovakia,
twenty-one percent in Lithuania, and thirty-five percent in the UK. 2 Euro-
pean voters generally turnout in high numbers, but cannot be bothered to
do so in EP elections.
Even more problematic for the democratic theory underlying the EP than
who votes is who wins, and more specifically, why they win. If the EP is
supposed to provide the EU with popular input about EU policymaking, at
the very least two things are required: first, that EU policy be considered
when voting decisions are made; and second, that the positions of the parties
on EU policies have an effect on who wins. Neither is currently the case.
It is relatively clear that neither EP campaigns nor their results have
much to do with the work of the institution. Campaigns are largely waged
around domestic issues."' Scholars from The University of Sussex Institute's
European Parties, Election & Referendums Network studied the content of
each EP campaign in twenty-one of the twenty-seven member states in
2004.11 Their reporters found that EU issues played virtually no role in
parties to do so in order to reap the electoral benefits. As it stands, there is little evidence that it matters
at all who is on the ballot.
79. Alexander C. Pacek & Benjamin Radcliff, Voter Participation and Party-group Fortunes in European
Parliament Elections, 1979-1999: A Cross-National Analysis, 56 POL. REs. Q. 91, 92 (2003); see also Hix,
WHAT'S WRONG, supra note 3, at 80.
80. See Hix, WHAT'S WRONG, supra note 3, at 80; Turnout at the European Elections, EUROPEAN EI.Ec-
TIONs RESULTS 2009, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/turnouten.
html (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) (showing that turnout was forty-three percent).
81. Judy Demspey, For East Europeans, the E. U. Election Was a Big Yawn, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 9,
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/world/europe/10ihtvote.html?scp= 1&sq= for%
20East%2OEuropeans,%20rhe%2OEU%20election%20was%20a%20big%20yawn&st=cse (stating that
Latvia's turnout was 30 percent higher than Lithuana's, largely because of local elections); Matthew
Taylor, Flying the Flag for Apathy, GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 9, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.
uk/politics/2009/jun/08/voter-turnout-liverpool; Turnout at the European Elections, supra note 80 (stating
that Belgium and Luxembourg had turnout over ninety percent.)
82. See Turnout at the European Elections, supra note 80.
83. See CHALMERS, ET AL., supra note 35, at 111-12.
84. European Parliament Elections, EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONs AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK, SUs-
SEX EUROPEAN INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/'-4-2-2.html (last visited
Nov. 11, 2010) (listing a series of Euopean Parliament election briefings). Dan Hough, the analyst that
studied the German elections, wrote: "The election held to elect 99 German representatives to the Euro-
pean Parliament was always likely to be hijacked by affairs specific to the national arena. European
themes played, at best, an occasional role in the campaign -at worst they were completely insignifi-
cant." Dan Hough, 2004 Parliament Election Briefing No. 3: The European Parliament Election in Germany,
June 13, 2004, available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epernep2004germany.pdf (last visited
Nov. 11, 2010). The analyst covering Poland, Aleks Szczerbiak, wrote: "European issues played a secon-
dary role in a dull and lifeless campaign to which the main parties and media gave a very low priority and
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fifteen of the twenty-one campaigns. In three others-Denmark, Britain,
and Sweden-there was campaigning built around major (and minor) party
stances that were simply either pro- or anti-EU.85 Only in three countries-
France, Ireland, and the Netherlands-was there any discussion about the
substance of EU policy.86
The 2009 election does not appear to be different. In the UK, a scandal
caused by expenses charged to the government by members of the national
parliament dominated election campaigns. 7 In Italy, the Prime Minister's
alleged extramarital affairs and corruption problems were the top campaign
issues. 8 The German elections were seen and treated by the parties as a dress
run for the next year's domestic elections.8 ' The Sussex Institute studies for
2009 show the same results: in all but a few countries, European issues
either were not featured at all or received extremely little attention relative
that was overshadowed by a government formation crisis and possibility of an early parliamentary elec-
tion." Aleks Szczerbiak, 2004 European Parliament Election Briefing No. 1: The European Parliament Election
in Poland, June 13, 2004, available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epernep2004poland.pdf
(last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
85. See Nicholas Aylott & Magnus Blomgren, 2004 European Parliament Election Briefing No. 7: The
European Parliament Election in Sweden, June 13 2004, available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/
epernep2004sweden.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2010); Ann-Christina L. Knudsen, 2004 European Parlia-
ment Election Briefing No. 11: The European Parliament Election in Denmark, June 13 2004, available at http:/
/www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epernep2004denmark.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2010); Paul Taggart,
2004 European Parliament Election Briefing No. 14: The European Parliament Election in the United Kingdom,
June 10 2004, available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern-ep200
4
-uk.pdf (last visited
Nov. 11, 2010). The studies reveal that in countries where EU issues play virtually no role, the only EU-
centric content is centered around competing claims that parties can get more money from Brussels. For
instance, in the largely European-issue-devoid German EP elections of 2004, the Free Democratic Party
used the slogan "We can do Europe better." Hough, supra note 84, at 7 . The only European issue
mentioned in the EP campaign in Hungary was the claim, made by all four major parties, that they
would maximize transfer from Brussels to Budapest. Agnes Batory, 2004 European Parliament Election
Briefing No. 8: The European Parliament Election in Hungary, June 13 2004, available at http://www.
sussex.ac.uk/seildocuments/epernep200
4
hungary.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2010). This is common
throughout the reports.
86. See Robert Harmsen, 2004 European Parliament Election Election Briefing No. 17: The European Par-
liament Election in the Netherlands, June 10, 2004, available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/seildocuments/
epern-ep2004-netherlands.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2010); Michael Holmes, 2004 European Parliament
election Briefing No.2: The European Parliament Election in Ireland, June 11 2004, available at http://www.
sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epernep2004ireland.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2010); Sally Marthaler, 2004
European Parliament Election Briefing No. 6: The European Parliament Election in France, June 13 2004,
available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/seildocuments/pernep2004france.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
87. Ben Quinn, European Elections Pound Britain's Broum, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, June 8, 2009, at 4
(quoting a political scientist as saying "In my lifetime there has been never been an election so domi-
nated by one issue to the of (sic) extent of the expenses issue.").
88. The New EP-National Impact, THENEwEP.EU (July 16, 2009), http://thenewep.com/national-
state-of-play/. ("(Italy's] electoral campaign, which started quite late (at the beginning of May), did not
focus on EU-related issues, but was mainly characterised by scandals, personal attacks and gossip, widely
publicised by the media both at national and international level.").
89. Id. ("There was low interest in the European elections among German voters and consequently a
historically low voter turnout of forty-three percent. As in the past, campaigns mostly focused on na-
tional issues and national politicians.").
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to domestic issues.90 EU policy is simply not very important in EP election
campaigns.
Similarly, the results of EP elections also have little to do with voter
opinions about European policy. The central finding of the last twenty-five
years of studying EP elections is that they are "second-order national con-
tests."" That is, voters use these elections to comment on their current
domestic government, or, put another way, EP elections are a referendum on
a country's prime minister. This effect is stronger in some places, such as
those member states with histories of alternating government rather than
governance by grand coalition, but domestic politics nevertheless remain the
largest determinant of voting in European elections in all European coun-
tries. 9 2 This finding is extremely robust. That EP elections are "second or-
der" is the central and probably only generally agreed upon finding in the
scholarship on EU politics. 93
Moreover, there is no evidence that the votes, speeches, and promises
made by MEPs affect EP elections at all. While it is possible that there
might be some small exceptions to this rule-some observers credit the
Green Party's strong EP election performance in France to the personality
and politics of Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the former 1968 radical who leads the
party in the EP-virtually nothing that happens in Strasbourg matters in
the voting booth.94 The campaign trail is the same: all evidence suggests
that voters are unaware of any European issues in these elections, and EP
campaigns do not help them decide how to vote.'5
The only way the results of EP elections systematically differ from na-
tional ones is that small parties tend to slightly over-perform.
[A]nti-EU parties and green parties on average do better in Euro-
pean elections than in national elections. But these 'European ef-
fects' are minor. Hence, despite the growing powers of the
90. Even in those countries where European issues did feature in the campaign, they were not deci-
sive. For instance, in the Netherlands, where there was a great deal of pro- and anti-European rhetoric in
the campaign, domestic issues determined the results nearly entirely. See Stijn van Kessel, The European
Parliament Election in the Netherlands, June 4 2009, available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/
no_28_epern-epO9_-netherlands.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2010). In Finland, "defending national inter-
ests" was the major theme, and in Malta, Sussex's analyst noted that it was difficult to determine what is
European policy and what is domestic policy, as the two are substantially intertwined. See Roderick Pace,
The European Parliament Election in Malta, June 6 2009, available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/
documents/no_27_epernep2009malta.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2010); Tapio Raunio, The European Parlia-
ment Election in Finland, June 7 2009, available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/seildocuments/epern-ep09-
finlandep.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
91. THE POLITICAL. SysTEM, supra note 40, at 193-96.
92. Marsh, Testing the Second-Order Election Model After Four European Elections, supra note 3, at 606.
93. Id.; see also Hix, WHAT'S WRONG, supra note 3, at 79-80; Simon Hix & Michael Marsh, Punish-
ment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections, 69(2) J. POL. 495, 495-96 (2007).
94. Archie Bland & Toby Green, How Europe Voted and What it Means, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), June 9,
2009 at 12 (crediting green parry's French success to Cohn-Bendit); John Lichfield, Danny the Green:
Daniel Cohn-Bendit, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), June 13, 2009, at 36.
95. Marsh & Franklin, supra note 71, at 24-28.
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European Parliament, neither positions on matters regarding Eu-
ropean integration, nor on matters regarding 'normal' left-right
policy, have much of an effect on electoral outcomes.96
Although there is little solid evidence explaining these small parties'
over-performance in these elections, their successes are consistent with the
evidence suggesting that most voters know and care little about EP elec-
tions. In the absence of knowledge about the actual performance or positions
of parties, one would expect parties with single-issue messages that are clear
from their names (it does not take much outside knowledge to know what
the United Kingdom Independence Party or the Green Party advocates) to
have an advantage in attracting low-information votes.
The 2009 EP elections followed the usual script. Burson-Marsteller, the
large public relations and lobbying firm, hired several prominent political
scientists to design a model to predict the EP elections. Their model started
with preferences about national parties without any reference to the EP.'7
The reason for this was simple: "Opinion polls for European Parliament
elections are less accurate than opinion polls for national elections. This is
because voters are usually thinking about national elections when answering
European election polls."98 With only some small tweaks related to minor
party votes, the model was able to predict ninety-eight percent of the seats
by Euro-party, and ninety percent of the seats won by each national party.'9
In 2009, center-right parties received the majority of seats in EP elections
in most of the larger European countries, including Britain, France, Ger-
many, Italy, and Spain.100 However, this was not a result of increased sup-
port for center-right parties-support for major center-right parties barely
changed-but rather reflects the voter loss of center-left parties to far right,
liberal and green parties throughout Europe.50 Most notable was the success
96. Hix & Marsh, supra note 93, at 495. The best explanation for the success of small parties is that
some voters feel free to cast a protest vote when there is little chance that the popular vote will affect the
composition of domestic government. See Erik Oppenhuis et al., The Party Context: Outcomes, in CHOOSING
EUROPE? THE EUROPEAN ELECTORATE AND NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE FACE OF UNION 288-89 (Cees
van der Eijk & Mark Franklin eds., 1996).
97. Burson-Marsteller, Predict '09 Methodology, June 4, 2009, http://qa.predict09.host3.crossfactory.
net/defaultlen-us.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 2010).
98. Id.
99. The reason the numbers are different is that there was some tradeoff. For instance, the model's
prediction was low by one seat the support for the conservatives in Finland, but was high by one in
Germany. Burson-Marsteller, Predict '09 Executive Summary, June 16, 2009, http://qa.predict09.host3.
crossfactory.net/default/en-us.aspx.
100. See Swing Low, Swing Right, supra note 2.
101. See Ian Traynor, Defiant or in Denial? Champions of EU Progress Stopped in Their Tracks, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), June 9, 2009, at 6, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/08/centre-left-
european-elections (quoting Simon Hix as saying "The centre-right won the election, but it [their vote]
did not really go up . .. {ilt's the centre-left that has gone down, in government or in opposition" and
noting that "[w]herever the centre-left collapsed, the extreme right frequently scored its most spectacular
gains-in Hungary, Austria, the Netherlands and Britain. But pro-EU left liberals and Greens also did
well."); see also Swing Low, Swing Right, supra note 2 ("Support for mainstream centre-right parties held
steady or fell slightly.").
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of small parties. The radical anti-European United Kingdom Independence
Party won two MEP seats in Britain, the Greens nearly outpolled the Social-
ists in France, anti-Muslim and immigration parties won seats in the
Netherlands and Belgium, an anti-Roma party did well in Hungary, and a
pro-internet piracy party won a seat in Sweden. 102
Although center-right parties did well across Europe, it is hard to under-
stand this result as a common position on what the EU should do. National
issues dominated EP election campaigns, and center-right parties (as well as
center-left parties) across Europe have diverged tremendously on major
questions of the day, like the amount of government economic intervention
is necessary following the economic crisis. 0 Further, even if European vot-
ers have common preferences about what their national governments should
do, it is unclear why or whether these translate to preferences about Euro-
pean regulation. EU legislation generally replaces or stands in for national
regulations, meaning that EU regulation that is relatively pro-market in
France may involve more regulation than currently exists in the UK. 0 4 Fi-
nally, it is clear that all sorts of factors affect EP elections-like the UK
expenses scandal-that are completely irrelevant to what the EP does. As
such, it is hard to understand the results of these elections as reflecting
much about voters' EU policy preferences.1os
As campaigns have little impact on who is elected, it is unsurprising that
they have little effect on elected MEPs once they are in power as well. Euro-
pean issues do not figure much in EP campaigns, and when they do, it is the
national interest, and not right/left ideologies about European regulation,
that are mentioned. 0 6 However, when voting in the EP, MEPs toe ideologi-
cal party lines with respect to EU policy, and national issues are muted.
102. Stephen Castle, Disaffection Dominates European Voting, N.Y.TIMEs, June 8, 2009, at A5, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/08/world/europe/08union.html; Trouble at the Polls: The Worrying
European Elections, ECONOMIST, June 13, 2009, available at http://www.economist.com/node/13829453
?story_id=13829453. For full results by party, see Results of the 2009 European Elections, http://www.
europarl.europa.eulparliament/archive/elections2009/en/new-parliament-en.html (last visited Nov. 6,
2010) (listing 2009 EP election results by country by party).
103. See, e.g., Karrin Benhold & Stephen Castle, European Leaders Looking for Common Ground in an
Economic Crisis, N.Y.TMEs, Nov. 25, 2008, at 7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/2/
business/worldbusiness/25euro.html (center-right leaders in France and Germany disagree on proper Eu-
ropean response to economic crisis); Arthur Sinodinos, Pragmatists the Voters' Choice, AusTRAu~AN, June 12,
2009, available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/pragmatists-the-voters-choice/story-
fn5r96n6-1225733474748; Patrick Wintour, Broum and Sarkozy Nudge Germans Towards Fresh Economic
Measures, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Dec. 9, 2008, at 11 (center-left British PM, center-right French President
and center-right European Commission President all agree on stimulus but disagree with center-right
German prime minister).
104. See Young, supra note 7, at 1672 (describing how EU laws "trump" domestic laws).
105. It should be noted that there is likely a substantial correlation in what voters think about domes-
tic politics and what they think about EU politics. However, that correlation is certainly not very
tight-plenty of factors affecting domestic party preferences are irrelevant to EU decisionmaking. Fur-
thermore, the absence of campaigning on EU issues means that there is little retrospective accountability.
Voters may select politicians based on preferences that correlate with their preferences on EU issues, but
they do not police MEP behavior once they get to Strasbourg.
106. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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MEPs of like-minded domestic parties join in common caucuses. In the
first elected EP, there were three major coalitions-a Christian Democratic
coalition called the European People's Party and the Socialists, a Social
Democratic coalition, and a somewhat smaller coalition of liberal parties.1 o7
Several other groups formed over time-some were "coalitions" that actu-
ally comprised of one or two national parties, others were odd pairings of
non-ideologically aligned groups, and others were true multinational, ideo-
logically consistent groupings.108 These caucuses grew into real organiza-
tions-separate legal entities with substantial budgets provided by the
EU.109 There are now eight major Euro-parties: the European People's Party,
which includes members from most mainstream center-right parties in Eu-
rope, the Party of European Socialists, the Alliance of Liberals and Demo-
crats for Europe (liberals and centrist parties) and parties representing Far
Leftists-Nordic Greens, Regionalists, Greens, hard right anti-Europeans,
and a new bloc consisting of anti-European mainstream conservative parties
from the UK, the Czech Republic, Poland, and others. 10
Given their lack of electoral mandate, these Euro-parties are remarkably
ideologically coherent. Simon Hix, a leading EP scholar, studied roll call
data in the EP and has shown that Euro-party cohesion (common voting
among party members) has increased even as the number of countries repre-
sented in each party has also increased."' Further, the main division among
the parties is left-right ideology, not national competition. "Left-right
politics explains an overwhelming proportion of voting in the European Par-
liament. In contrast, national interests, independent of national party posi-
tions, have very little systematic influence on voting in the European
Parliament."1 12 This is particularly odd, given that when European issues
are raised in EP elections, it is almost always parties making claims about
their superior ability to bring home resources or to make the EU work bet-
ter for their home country."'
It is thus little wonder that voters fail to turn out, nor that the introduc-
tion of elections to the EP fails to confer much democratic legitimacy on the
EU as a whole. The EU funds the highly respected Eurobarometer polls,
which study popular opinion across Europe by conducting 1000 interviews
in each member state." 4 In 1979, before the introduction of direct elections
107. See DEMOCRATIC POLITICS, supra note 4, at 21-29.
108. Id.
109. See Day & Shaw, supra note 67, at 296-97.
110. DEMOCRATIC POLITICS, supra note 4, at 23, 26; Nicholas Watt & Ian Traynor, Tories Head New
Rightwing Fringe Group in Europe, GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 23, 2009, at 13 (discussing new Euro-party).
111. DEMOCRATIC POLITICS, supra note 4, at 104.
112. Id. at 180-81.
113. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
114. Hix, WHAT'S WRONG, supra note 3, at 51. There are only a few exceptions to the 1000 inter-
views per country rule. The EU funds 2000 interviews in Germany, 1300 in the UK, and 600 in Lux-
embourg. See Standard Eurobarometer 70, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eulpublic opinion/
archives/ebleb70/eb7Oen.htm (last updated June 7, 2010).
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to the EP, support for the EU-as measured by whether respondents
thought membership was beneficial for their country-was fifty-nine per-
cent."' By 1991, it had risen to seventy-two percent." 6 However, between
1991 and 1996, the period during which the EP's power grew most dramat-
ically following the Maastricht Treaty, support dropped to just over fifty
percent, where it has, with a few bumps, stayed.111
Some scholars have claimed that the failures of EP elections have caused
this drop in legitimacy."" They claim that before the EP was given substan-
tial power, European citizens believed that member states controlled the
EU, but that when the EP became a symbol of an independent EU, citizens
became disappointed with the absence of democratic accountability. How-
ever, there are reasons to doubt this causal story. In Eurobarometer polls,
European citizens report that they trust the EP slightly more than they do
other EU institutions.'1 9 Nonetheless, empowering the EP has not increased
the degree to which EU citizens support their country's continued member-
ship in the EU, nor has it stopped complaints about a democratic deficit.
Yves Meny has noted that "the democratic deficit argument never raged as
much as it did after the election of MEPs by universal suffrage." 20
The problems of EP elections have left the EP unable to fulfill its role in
the EU institutional structure. The EP is supposed to be a popularly chosen
pan-European body that checks the influence of the bureaucratic Commis-
sion and the member-state controlled Council. Instead, it is a highly bureau-
cratic body selected on the basis of member state politics without any
reference to EU issues. The goal of creating a three-part balance of powers is
a failure, and EP elections are the cause of that failure.
II. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS AS AN INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM:
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN REFORM AND THE EXISTING SEPARATION OF
POWERS INSIDE THE EUROPEAN UNION
The problems of the EP, and of the EU's "democratic deficit" more gener-
ally, have generated much debate and many proposals for how they may be
115. Comm'n of the European Communities, Standard Eurobarometer 11: Public Opinion in the European
Community, at 44 (May 1979), available at http://ec.europa.eulpublicopinion/archives/eb/ebll /eb11 en.
htm.
116. Comm'n of the European Communities, Standard Eurobarometer 35: Public Opinion in the European
Community, at 3 (June 1991), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb35/eb35_en.
htm.
117. Standard Eurobarometer 70, supra note 114, at 31; Hix, WHAT'S WRONG, supra note 3, at 52-53.
118. See, e.g., Mark Franklin & Cees van der Eijk, The Problem: Representation and Democracy in the
European Union, in CHOOSING EUROPE? THE EUROPEAN ELECTORATE AND NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE
FACE OF UNION, supra note 71, at 7-8.
119. In the last Standard EuroBarometer poll, fifty-one percent "tended to trust" the EP, while only
forty-seven percent and forty-eight percent "tended to trust" the European Commission and the Euro-
pean Central Bank, respectively. Standard Eurobarometer 70, supra note 114, at 165.
120. Yves Meny, De la Democratie en Europe: Old Concepts and New Challenges, 41 J. COMMON MKT.
STUo. 1, 8 (2003); see also Sieberson, supra note 56, at 204-05.
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solved. The literature on the democratic deficit is vast and varied, perhaps
the most studied subject in European politics in the last thirty years.12
Rather than address the entirety of this literature, it makes more sense to
look at the two leading entrants in the debate over the democratic deficit.12 2
Although they differ substantially in prescription, both from each other and
from the existing efforts of the EU to respond to the problems of EP elec-
tions, they have something central in common.
Simon Hix and Andrew Moravcsik have developed opposing analyses of
the problem (or lack thereof) of democracy in the EU. Each of them pro-
motes a very different vision of what the EU should do to resolve the fact
that EP elections do not provide much democratic input into EU decision-
making. Moravcsik proffers that European citizens are simply wrong to
worry about democratic input in the EU, effectively rejecting the impor-
tance of the EP's stated role. Hix goes in the entirely opposite direction,
suggesting that much, if not all, of the EU governing structure should be
determined by European elections, with the composition of the Commission
turning on EP results and the Council dividing along partisan grounds as
well. Although neither proposes changes to the treaties that give the EU its
institutional form, both call for agreement among political elites to effec-
tively nullify the separation of powers envisioned by European leaders when
they designed the EU's institutions. Thus, both arguments effectively call
for changing the institutional arrangements of the EU by widespread elite
agreement.
121. Indeed, the number of times it has been suggested that the literature on the EU and its demo-
cratic deficit is too large to summarize is itself too large to summarize. For a few examples from recent
legal literature, see, e.g., Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 44 VA. J. INT'L
L. 501, 543 (2004) ("Such concerns about a 'democratic deficit' are commonly heard with regards to the
European Union, where the power of national governments to act in numerous areas has been restricted
by treaty obligations."); Youri Deyvust, The European Union's Institutional Balance After the Treaty of Lisbon:
"Community Method" and "Democratic Deficit" Reassessed, 39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 247, 254 (2008) ("The litera-
ture from political scientists debating the existence and scope of the "democratic deficit" in the EU is
rich."); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Glohalizing Administrative Law, 115
YALE L.J. 1490, 1515 (2006) ("The EU's democratic deficit, for example, has become a major topic of
scholarly discussion and similar concerns have been focused on other supranational governance efforts.");
Sanford Levinson, How the United States Constitution Contributes to the Democratic Deficit in America, 55
DRAKE L. REv. 859, 860 (2007) ("There are more than 500,000 hits that come up when one uses Google
to search for 'democratic deficit'-revealing that it is especially pervasive in discussions of the European
Union and the general project of European integration."); Jan Muller, Carl Schmitt and the Constitution of
Europe, 21 CARDOzo L. REV. 1777, 1778 (2000) ("Secondly, there is the old, and, one might say, by now
rather trite, issue of the 'democratic deficit.'"); Martin Nettesheim, Developing a Theory of Democracyfor the
European Union, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 358, 358 (2005) ("The number of books and articles ex-
pounding upon the problem of whether or not the European Union (EU) presents a 'Democratic Deficit'
and if so whether and how this may be overcome, has become nearly too numerous to count."); Neil S.
Siegel, International Delegations and the Values of Federalism, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 93, 103 (2008)
("This is of course familiar learning by now. Commentators have written increasingly about the 'demo-
cratic deficit' that characterizes international institutions, particularly the European Union.").
122. See, e.g., Luciano Bardi, Parties and Party System in the European Union: National and Suprantional
Dimensions, in POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE NEw EUROPE: POLITICAL AND ANALYTICAL CHAllENGEs 293,
293 (Kurt Richard Luther & Ferdinand Muller-Rommel eds., 2002) (describing Hix and Moravcsik as
having "revitalized the theoretical debate" about the study of democracy in the EU).
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These arguments in favor of tacit amendment rely on a common assess-
ment that the reality of current EU politics is not achieving the goals be-
hind the logic of its system of separation of powers. This same belief is
inherent in the EU's repeated decisions to allocate more power to the EP,
which were intended to make it powerful enough that people cared about it.
This section will show that the current debates over the EP assume that the
failure of its elections requires a change in the logic of the EU's system of
separation of powers. The next section will argue that this assumption is not
necessary.
After writing his views on democracy in the EU over the course of a
decade, Moravcsik concentrated them into a remarkable article: "In Defense
of the 'Democratic Deficit': Reassessing Legitimacy in the European
Union."1 23 Its central argument is that the impression, which many Euro-
pean citizens share, that Europe lacks democratic legitimacy is simply
wrong. "Concern about the EU's 'democratic deficit' is misplaced." 124
The first error of the critics that denounce EU's democratic legitimacy, he
argues, is that they ignore what the EU does. Unlike the undemocratic
super-state it is sometimes painted as, the EU makes policy in only a limited
number of areas, mostly regulating cross-border economic effects. Moreover,
it does not implement most of its own regulations, leaving that to member
states. The EU also has a small budget, just over one percent of the EU's
GDP, rendering it incapable of either redistributing incomes or engaging in
many of the other ordinary activities of a modern regulatory state.125 The
areas in which it does make policy (e.g. international trade, anti-trust, and
consumer protection) are low salience, and governments often make these
decisions at some level of removal from voters.126 The EU "simply
specializ[es) in those functions of modern democratic governance that tend
to involve less direct political participation."1 27 When the nature of the is-
sues addressed by EU policy is taken into account, the lack of direct voter
involvement in EU policymaking looks less problematic.
Second, Moravcsik notes that there is a great deal of democratic input
into European decisionmaking. EU policymaking requires a great deal of
consensus, as there are a number of checks and balances imbedded in the
various majorities and super-majorities needed to get legislation through the
Commission, the Council and the EP. This mitigates the failings of EP elec-
tions. As Moravcsik states:
123. Andrew Moravcsik, In Defense of the 'Democratic Deficit': Reassessing Legitimaty in the European
Union, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 603 (2002).
124. Id. at 603.
125. Id. at 608.
126. Id. at 616. One might quibble, however, with his determination that international trade is a
low-salience issue.
127. Id. at 606. The strongest EU institution, the European Central Bank, is a perfect example of his
point. After all, central banks are often independent and free of any direct democratic input.
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Whereas one might criticize the absence of clear programmatic
elections, the EP nonetheless has an effective system of party co-
operation, with votes most often split along party lines and recog-
nizable ideological cleavages shaping voting patterns. Among the
most relevant differences between the European Parliament and
national parliaments appears to be the tendency of the EP to reach
decisions by large majorities. Yet this tendency underscores the
tendency of the EU to reach decisions by large majorities . . .
unsurprising given the high level of support required in the
Council of Ministers-and should give us reason for confidence
that it is legislating in the 'European' interest. 128
Finally, and most importantly, all policy must be favored by a large ma-
jority of democratically-elected state governments in the Council. Talk of a
democratic deficit is misplaced not only because the EU acts only in certain
areas, but also because it only acts when there is broad consensus across
European political players.
Moravcsik provides a powerful defense of the EU as an institution, but he
does not address the narrower question of how to solve the problem of the
EU's alleged democratic deficiency. Unless simply telling voters that they
are wrong to be worried about the democratic legitimacy of the EU is an
effective strategy, more is needed if the EU wants to garner greater popular
support. Further, and more importantly for the purposes of this Article,
Moravcsik's argument for inaction in the face of EP elections' failure to pro-
duce direct democratic input is effectively a call to revise the normative
underpinnings of the separation of powers in the EU. If the EP is supposed
to provide a balance to the role of the Council and Commission, and it is not
doing so, then claiming that there is no problem is a suggestion that the
theory of separation of powers in the EU is flawed.
Hix approaches this problem from a very different perspective but simi-
larly calls for revising the separation of powers in the EU.129 He argues that
the EU currently suffers from two problems-gridlock and lack of electoral
competition-and the resulting political stasis has caused more and more
Europeans to question whether it is good for their country to be a member
of the EU. The increased size and ambit of the EU, due to the addition of
new members and the increased number of areas in which it is allowed to set
policy, have created problems for its current decisionmaking apparatus.o3 0
128. Id. at 612.
129. Hix developed these ideas in a series of articles as well, one of them notably written directly in
response to Moravcsik's paper, as well as a recent book. See generally Hix, WHAT'S WRONG, supra note 3;
Andreas Follesdal & Simon Hix, Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and
Moravcsik, 44 J. ComMoN MKT. STUD. 533 (2006); Simon Hix, Elections, Parties and Institutional Design: A
Comparative Perspective on European Union Democracy, 21 WEsT EURO. POL. 19 (1998); Simon Hix, Parties at
the European Level and the Legitimacy of EU Socio-Economic Policy, 33 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 527 (1995).
130. Hix, WHAT'S WRONG, supra note 3, at 31-49.
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Further, as Part I.B discusses, EP elections are not truly European but na-
tional instead.'"' This means that the only true way voters have of expres-
sing their beliefs about Europe is through their domestic governments, and
EU issues only make up a part of the domestic agenda. The result is that
voters are unable to express opinions about the future of the EU. This lack of
voice in the EU is what is driving the desire for exit, and is why, Hix claims,
popular support for EU membership has fallen.13 2
Hix argues that neither the EU nor the EP will function well until there
is true pan-European partisan political competition. To support these
claims, he invokes the standard (and extremely persuasive) arguments about
partisan competition in all contexts. Introducing partisan competition
would: (1) promote policy innovation, as parties would have an incentive to
develop new ideas in order to get votes; (2) permit the formation of cross-
institutional coalitions, which is particularly important for solving gridlock
in the EU; (3) generate media coverage; (4) give citizens a heuristic for ex-
pressing policy views, which would encourage the development of opinions
about European politics; and (5) create a mandate for policy change. 33 Hix
also argues that "perhaps most profoundly, democratic politics leads to the
formation of new political identities."'3 4 Europeans will become more European
in their understandings of politics and their self-identification (and corre-
spondingly less French, German, British, etc.) if they engage in the type of
collective democratic decisionmaking that common pan-European parties
would enable.
Creating such competition would not require formal changes in the trea-
ties that give the EU its organizational shape. Hix proposes two reforms.
First, positions of power inside the EP are divided among all parties, and
Hix argues that if the party forming the majority of EP were granted more
power to name officials in the Parliament, it would encourage more aggres-
sive electoral politicking.135 Acknowledging that this is unlikely to accom-
plish much, he proposes a much more dramatic solution: using the current
system to create an effectively direct election for the Presidency of the Euro-
pean Commission. 36 This could be achieved if the Euro-parties (and their
national party members) agree on candidates for Commission President
before the election. If these candidates then behaved like American presiden-
tial candidates, they would create enough media and public support to get
voters interested in European elections. Agreement by national party lead-
ers, who vote in the Council (when they are in power domestically) and have
131. Id. at 76-86.
132. Id at 65-66. Hix does not expressly use Albert Hirschman's terminology of exit and voice, but
the idea is similar. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 40-41 (1970).
133. Hix, WHAT'S WRONG, supra note 3, at 98-107.
134. Id. at 105.
135. Id at 140.
136. id at 155-78.
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the power to nominate the Commission President, in conjunction with Euro
Party groups could permit this even without revision to the governing
treaty.137 Hix also thinks the Council should behave in a more openly parti-
san manner.138
These proposals are intriguing, despite being full of practical problems.
For instance, his proposal calls for widespread agreement from all the com-
ponent parties of the pan-European parties about candidates for Commission
President without explaining what their incentives for doing so are. Further,
his system would recreate some of the problems of the U.S. Electoral Col-
lege, because small countries are overrepresented in the EP and as a result,
the popular vote winner would not necessarily be elected.139
Even so, Hix is convincing when he argues that true mass membership in
pan-European parties would be a powerful force for integration, making the
EU more dynamic on policy and the elections clearer for voters. Further, he
may be right that pan-European parties would help create a pan-European
"demos." However, there is little evidence that this is what anyone in Eu-
rope wants. The proposal would largely undo the current separation of pow-
ers in the EU. By making the Commission turn on EP elections and the
Council more partisan, it would remove the balance at the heart of the EU's
institutional structure. Rather than having different interests represented in
different parts of the government, Hix would have direct representative de-
mocracy at the European level decide all EU policy.
One might agree with either Hix or Moravcsik, but it ultimately requires
a determination about the relative importance of pan-European popular rep-
resentation and political identities versus protecting member state auton-
omy and national political identities. What both presuppose is that the
current system of allocating power, in which the EP is supposed to play a
popular democratic role in a complex separation of powers, is flawed and
cannot be fixed.
I disagree, or at least think there is no reason yet to believe that this is so,
as the next section will make clear.
137. Id at 160.
138. Id. at 153.
139. See Marcus G. Puder, Constitutionalizing Government in the European Union: Europe's New In-
stituitonal Quartet Under the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 77, 92
(2004) (describing over and underrepresentation by population in the EP). Germany is particularly un-
derrepresented by population in the EP. For instance, there is one German MEP for every 829,000
inhabitants, while there is one MEP from Luxembourg for every 72,000 inhabitants. Id.
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III. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS AS A MISMATCH PROBLEM:
USING ELECTION LAW TO MAKE THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
PLAY ITS INSTITUTIONAL ROLE
Whereas Hix, Moravcsik and European leaders all see the failures of EP
elections and move directly to the question of why the separation of powers
in the EU is flawed, there is another way to respond. Rather than respond-
ing to the failure of elections by changing the institutional structure of the
EU (or undermining it without formally changing it), EU leaders could
attempt to change the way elections are contested to bring them into line
with the institutional goals of the EU.
Election systems are not neutral. The laws that govern elections in many
ways dictate the way elections are contested, if not the results directly. For
instance, election systems that use single-member districts and "first-past-
the-post" vote counting (like all federal and almost all state and local elec-
tions in the United States) trend towards having only two political parties.
Political scientists call this Duverger's Law.140 Because voters and supporters
hate to waste their votes and efforts, they abandon third party candidates to
focus on the two most viable candidates. By using a first-past-the-post sys-
tem, the United States ensures a clear choice between two centrist
alternatives.
Similarly, the voting system used for EP elections ensures that the elec-
tions will be "second-order": domestic politics will matter more than Euro-
pean politics in determining who wins elections. More specifically, the
interaction between the election laws used, rationally ignorant voters, and
the competitive state of play among domestic parties explains why EP elec-
tions are second order. EP ballots do not provide voters with heuristics that
track performance in the EP, and leave voters, who have little direct knowl-
edge of individual MEP voting patterns, without the ability to cast ballots
that track their preferences on European issues. The result is elections that
do not achieve the goals underlying the decision to hold EP elections.
This does not have to be so. The EU could change the election law system
to make EP elections turn on European issues. By requiring political parties
to get a certain threshold amount of the vote in a majority of EU countries
in order to get any members elected from any country, the EU could force
140. It is called Duverger's Law following the classic work of Maurice Duverger. See generally MAU-
RICE DUVERGER, POuTICAL PARTIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE MODERN STATE (Bar-
bara North & Robert North trans., Lund Humphries 2d ed. 1959); William H. Riker, The Two-Party
System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science, 76 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 753, 764
(1982). There is substantial debate about the degree to which Duverger's Law is deterministic, probabil-
istic and/or causal. See William H. Riker, Duverger's Law Revisited, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLIT-
ICAL CONSEQUENCEs 19, 19-42 (Bernard Grofman & Arend Lijphart eds., 1986). For an argument that
Duverger's Law has a normative component, see David Schleicher, 'Politics as Markets' Reconsidered: Natu-
ral Monopolies, Competitive Democratic Philosophy and Primary Ballot Access in American Elections, 14 S. CT.
ECON. REV. 163, 168-70 (2006).
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campaigns to be waged at the European, rather than the member state, level.
Further, by doing so, it could give voters the means of determining whom
in Europe to hold responsible for EU actions, something that the current
system does not permit.
A. The problem of mismatch in European Parliament elections
The EU clearly intended for EP elections to provide European voters with
the ability to comment directly on EU policy. They do not do so. The prob-
lem of EP elections is similar to one that has been diagnosed in several
places in the American context: a "mismatch" between the constitutional or
institutional goals for holding elections for certain types of office and how
elections actually operate. By understanding the problem of EP elections as a
"mismatch" problem, rather than as a problem that can only be solved
through changing the EU's institutional structure, we can better understand
how to improve European elections.
This section is divided into two parts. The first part lays out a basic
model explaining how "mismatches" can develop. 14' The second part dis-
cusses the fit between this model and EP elections.
1. A model of mismatch: why sub-national or super-national elections track
national party preference
Ordinarily it seems safe to believe that election results are a product of
voter preferences. Following Anthony Downs's classic work on parties, polit-
ical scientists assume that political parties behave much like business firms,
but instead of maximizing profits, they maximize vote share. 14 2 In order to
do so, they offer a program of policies that appeal to voters along the dimen-
sion over which they make their voting decision.' 4 In a first-past-the-post
and hence two-party system, this leads to what is generally known as the
"median voter theorem." If voter preferences about policy can be arrayed in
a single dimension (say left to right), the two parties will position them-
selves in order to appeal to the median voter, as getting her vote will mean
winning the election.144 In proportional representation systems, the predic-
tions of the model become more complicated, as the optimal strategy in a
multi-party election (and the number of parties that will decide to contest
the election) depends on a number of factors, including the legal standard
for what percentage of the vote is necessary to get a seat in Parliament, the
141. This basic model was first developed in Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 31, at
422-27.
142. Id. at 428-30; see also DowNs, supra note 24, at 114-49.
143. DowNs, supra note 24, at 139.
144. Id. at 141; Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 31, at 429. There has been a great deal of
research examining the effects of relaxing the extreme assumptions of the Downsian model. DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PuBuc CHOICE II: A REVISED EDITION OF PuBac CHOICE 180 (1989). However, the basic
concept of the model-that competitive pressures cause parties to propose popular policies-remains
robust. See Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 31, at 429 n.38.
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cost of new party entry and the distribution of preferences in the electo-
rate. 1 4  For the purposes here, the exact strategy is not particularly impor-
tant, just the idea that parties are seeking to maximize their vote share by
appealing to voters and that voters reward parties that appeal to their prefer-
ences or provide good results. Just as competition leads to efficient results in
markets, Downsian analysis leads us to believe that competition leads to
parties proposing policies favored by voters.
What is true for a single-level national election-say a presidential race or
an election for a national parliament-is not necessarily true in less well-
publicized elections at other levels of government. For instance, partisan
general elections for city council in American big cities are notoriously un-
competitive.'4 6 The vote in city council races in these cities mirrors the vote
for President of the United States almost entirely. Because in most major
cities one party dominates presidential races, it also dominates local races. 4 7
This is true despite substantial evidence that voter preferences about local
issues do not track preferences about national issues particularly closely.14 8
One can tell similar stories about statewide races for offices like Secretary of
State, in which voting is completely unrelated to performance or policies.14 9
In a simple Downsian world, it is impossible for one party to permanently
dominate elections with a huge share of the vote at any level of government.
If the majority party proposes policies that are not favored by most voters,
the minority party (or a new entrant) should position itself on issues at that
level of government to peel off support from the majority party, reintroduc-
ing competition. 15 0 However, in big city and a number of state elections, the
process by which the minority party becomes competitive by proposing pol-
icies designed to attract the median voter does not occur."'
145. DOWNS, supra note 24, at 123-27; Gary W. Cox, Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral
Systems, 34 AM. J. POL. Sci. 903, 920-22 (1990); see generally DOUGLAS W. RAE, THE POuTICAL CONSE-
QUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS (2d ed. 1971).
146. Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 31, at 419-21.
147. Id. at 424, 457-59. Where national elections are close, so are local elections. For instance, Indi-
anapolis is closely contested between the national political parties, with the vote for Democratic Presi-
dential candidates rising over the last ten years. Tracking the national trend, Democratic candidates for




148. Id. at 437-47.
149. See infra notes 227-228 and accompanying text.
150. See Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 31, at 428-29. Notably, this should be true even
if preferences on national issues track preferences on local issues perfectly. As long as the minority party
can position itself differently in national and local races, it should compete in a Downsian framework.
151. Recently, Kristen Badal and Jessica Trounstine have found that a large number of voters split
tickets between county elections and Presidential elections, with as many as thirty-five percent of coun-
ties having different parties win at the county and national level. See Kristen Badal & Jessica Trounstine,
Local Versus National Partisan Representation, available at http://faculty.ucmerced.eduL/jtrounstine/Local
partisanship.August09_2.pdf. Although this seems to conflict with other available data on city elec-
tions, when examined more closely, it does not. In their regression analyses, they found that counties
with large populations had far less split representation than less populated counties. Increasing the popu-
lation from the smallest county in their sample to the largest county decreases the probability of split
representation from sixty-eight percent to eight percent. Id. at 14. They also found that the percentage of
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The explanation turns on voter ignorance and the content of election laws.
Take big city elections. The rules governing American big city local elec-
tions, specifically campaign financing, ballot access and candidate selection
in local elections, play an important role in the lack of partisan competition.
First, as a matter of constitutional law, states cannot bar national parties
from using their financial and organizational muscle in local elections.
5 2
Second, state election laws guarantee ballot access to the two major parties,
usually by guaranteeing ballot access on the basis of election results in gu-
bernatorial campaigns.' Third, election laws make it extremely difficult for
those parties to establish localized identities that are different from their
national party brand. They do this by limiting the ability of people to
switch parties for the purposes of local election only and by requiring pri-
mary elections. If individuals make party affiliation decisions on the basis of
national and not local issues, preferences about local issues do not track pref-
erences about national issues very closely and people do not switch parties
between elections, the primary electorate for local offices will not have con-
sistent preferences on local issues.1 5 4 Primary elections across a city will thus
result in standard bearers from the same party with very different prefer-
ences about local issues, making the development of a local party identity
impossible.
residents who lived in cities, the number of councilors per 1000 persons, and the percentage of Blacks
and Latinos in the population, had strongly negative effects on split representation. Id at 13, 15. That is,
counties that look like big cities have little split representation, and counties that are primarily rural or
suburban have much more. Their data on Mayoral voting backs this up. Although they do not analyze
the data this way, this is completely consistent with an argument offered by William Fischel. Fischel
argued that smaller local governments were highly responsive to the interests of "home voters," who, due
to the effect of local policies on the variation in their housing values, were extremely involved and active
in local politics. WIuIAM A. FiSCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIs: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND USE POLlCIEs 15-16 (2001). Fischel sug-
gests elections in localities of over 100,000 will operate like the state or federal elections, in which
individuals are largely passive actors in politics. Id. at 92. City elections are, in fact, far worse, because
party information does not provide voters with the same type of information that it does in federal
elections, and hence blind reliance on party information does not promote representative outcomes. See
Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 31, at 445-52. Although other variables are quite important
in determining where ticket splitting occurs-particularly education, wealth and local diversity-it is
relatively clear that the dynamics of elections in big cities (and big urban counties) ensures that little
ticket splitting occurs.
152. See Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989) (holding that California could
not bar political parties from making endorsements or supporting candidates in their own primaries);
Cal. Democratic Party v. Lungren, 919 F. Supp. 1397, 1399 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that California
could not bar parties from endorsing candidates in non-partisan elections); Schleicher, City Council Elec-
tions, supra note 31, at 451 n.110.
153. See, e.g., Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 31, at 450 n.108.
154. See id. at 450-51.
155. There is a growing amount of evidence that party affiliation explains either little or nothing
about local politicians. Fernando Ferriera and Joe Gyourko have found that the party of the winning
candidate in mayoral elections does not affect the size of local government, the allocation of local spend-
ing or crime rates, in stark contrast with federal and state election results that have dramatic effects on
government policies. Fernando Ferriera & Joseph Gyourko, Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from U.S.
Cities, 124 Q.J. ECON. 399 (2009). Using a similar methodology, Elizabeth Gerber and Daniel Hopkins
found that a mayor's party affiliation does affect spending on local police and fire fighting (Republican
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Put together, these laws ensure that local voters have access to national
party heuristics on their ballots but these heuristics are only slightly useful.
The heuristics-i.e. the information that a local candidate is the candidate
of a national party-tells local voters something about a candidate, but not
much.15 6 However, if voters have little information about individual candi-
dates in local races, relying on national party heuristics is a rational strategy.
The reason is relatively simple: if voters know nothing about a local candi-
date and the only information they have is her national party membership
(that is, voters know whether a candidate is a Democrat or a Republican), it
is better to use this information than no information at all.
Further, local-only third parties do not enter even though there is little
competition.'" The reasons for this are that they cannot gain organizational
muscle and strong candidates without prying organizers and ambitious po-
tential politicians from the major parties, something that is discouraged by
the laws making party switching difficult. The use of first-past-the-post
elections and the financial muscle of the two major parties make such entry
even more difficult. As a result, local ballots feature national parties and not
local-third party entrants. Because people choose which party they prefer on
the basis of national politics, and because in most cities one party dominates
national elections, local elections are extremely uncompetitive.
This result can be generalized. If voters have strong allegiances to parties
at the national level and know little about individual politician behavior at
another level of government, it is rational for voters to vote their national
party preference in elections at the other level of government as long as there
is some correlation between the party and the voter's preferences about poli-
cies for the office in question. However, where laws and/or strategic concerns
mean that existing parties do not have the incentive or the ability to differ-
entiate themselves on policy grounds at the non-national level (and/or pro-
vide barriers to entry for new parties), elections do not necessarily provide
popular feedback on policies and politicians at that level. Thus, absent elec-
tion laws that lead parties to provide voters with clear office-relevant heuris-
tics, low-information campaigns featuring voters who are rational but not
particularly well-informed will not produce representative results at the
non-national level.
and independent mayors spend more than Democratic mayors) but not any other public policy variables.
Elizabeth Gerber & Daniel Hopkins, When Mayors Matter: Estimating the Impact of Mayoral Partisanship on
City Policy, (Soc. Sci. Res. Network Working Paper Series, Sept. 28, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1475237. At best, political party membership tells us very little-but
not nothing-about local politicians.
156. See Gerber & Hopkins, supra note 155; Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 31, at
450-51.
157. See Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 31, at 447, 452-54. There is only one local third
party in a major American city, the Charter Party of Cincinnati, and the reasons for its existence are
somewhat anomalous. Id. at 447.
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Everything political scientists have learned about how party heuristics
influence voting behavior backs up this result. It has long been known that
voters have little incentive to show up at the polls-the odds of their vote
mattering are negligible, while the costs of voting are real (if small)."" Fur-
ther, voters have even less incentive to become informed about politics, as
the costs of learning a politician's position on issues and whether those posi-
tions are good are far higher than simply showing up at the polls.'5 9 As a
result, voters know very little about politics.x6o
The only known solutions to this problem are political parties, and specif-
ically political party labels. In Morris Fiorina's well-known model, voters
use whatever information they pick up here or there about politicians-for
instance, when they see a politician doing something on the news while
flipping channels to get to Dancing With the Stars-and add it to a "run-
ning tally" of partisan preference.' 6 ' When a politician does something they
like, or when they notice something is going well, they add it to their tally
for the party in power, and they update their tally in a Bayesian manner.162
This running tally provides voters with a guide about how to vote. Further,
as long as parties are roughly consistent in their policy positions over time,
this can lead to roughly rational decisionmaking-particularly when
counted across a population.'6 3
Fiorina's model has been heavily criticized. However, these critics have
attacked it for not proving enough-they argue that voters, even with party
heuristics and retrospective evaluations, cannot actually assess the quality of
policies particularly well. Critics claim that voters often do not know
enough to attribute successes or failures to the right politicians or parties, do
not assess facts in a neutral way, develop partisan affiliations without respect
to issues and often punish or reward politicians for things outside of their
158. For the classic treatment of this, see DowNs, supra note 24, at 260-74.
159. Id. at 238-76; see also Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New
Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IoWA L. REv. 1287, 1325-26 (2004).
160. That voters know little about politics-little about the policies politicians enact, little about
what expert opinion on policies is and is not enough about who is to blame-is perhaps the most basic
finding of American political science. See, e.g., ROBERT S. ERIKSON, MICHAEL B. MAcKUEN & JAMES A.
STIMSON, THE MACRO POLITY xvii (2002) ("This story of unmotivated, ill-informed, and inattentive
voters is as old as the first examinations of individual voters, and it is confirmed anew by every subse-
quent voting study. Looked upon as individuals, most Americans care little about politics and possess a
level of knowledge of the details of political life that is consistent with not caring."); Somin, supra note
159, at 1304 ("The most important point established in some five decades of political knowledge re-
search is that the majority of American citizens lack even basic political knowledge.").
161. See FIORINA, supra note 25, at 65-83; DONALD WrrrMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE
10 (1995) ("Voters receive a lot of 'free' information-in the news, in the mail, and in ordinary
conversations.").
162. See Christopher H. Achen, Parental Socialization and Rational Party Identification, 24 POL. BEHAV-
IOR 151, 152-54 (2002) (creating formal Fiorina-like model with Bayesian updating).
163. Fiorina, supra note 25, at 198-200 (". . . our analysis supports the view of the voter as a rela-
tively rational fellow . . . ."); see also ERICKSON, MAcKUEN & STIMSON, supra note 160, at 119-35
(arguing that party identification, which is developed in a number of ways, can lead to macro-politically
rational behavior); Achen, supra note 162, at 165-67 (noting that Bayesian models can explain group
behavior even if they are not particularly believable with respect to individuals).
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control, like bad weather or high oil prices.'" Whether party heuristics and
retrospective evaluations are effective in making otherwise rationally igno-
rant voters behave as if they were fully informed is not important to the
claims of this Article. What is important, though, is that absent useful party
heuristics, it is hard to imagine that rationally ignorant voters can make
even partially informed decisions. Even Fiorina's critics would agree that
party heuristics are essential if voting decisions are going to have any sub-
stantive issue-based content to them whatsoever.165
Where such heuristics are absent, voters are frequently confused. If such
heuristics are available, but are not closely related to the issue being decided
in the election, voters will use them anyway.1 66 As we will see, this helps
explain what happens in EP elections.
2. Applying the mismatch model to European Parliament elections
Just like American local elections, EP elections do not provide voters with
useful heuristics and hence are not competitive over the issues that they are
intended to cover. The reasons for this are similar, although there are some
differences.
As discussed above, three basic predicates for the "mismatch" model ex-
ist. First, national parties have to be guaranteed ballot access on some other
type of ballot-local, or in this case, supra-national. Second, there must be
some reason why those parties do not adapt to contest the election on issues
related to the office in question, and why new entrants do not enter and
dominate these elections. Third, voters must have little direct knowledge of
the behavior of politicians in the local or supra-national body. If these three
conditions are met, it is unlikely that the election will produce results that
relate to the office in question.
The rules about ballot access in EP elections vary substantially from coun-
try to country and thus it is difficult to make general statements about
them. However, they do have several things in common. First, member
states choose the election law system used in EP elections, giving incumbent
164. See, e.g., DONALD GREEN, BRADLEY PALMQUIST & ERIC SHICKLER, PARTISAN HEARTS AND
MINDS 8-14, 89-139 (2002) (arguing that party identification is primarily social and evidence of macro-
responsiveness of voting to events is flawed.); Larry Bartels, Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in
Political Perceptions, 24 POL. BEHAVIOR 117, 120 (2002) (stating that Democrats and Republicans under-
stand political phenomena differently, biasing running tally decisionmaking); Somin, supra note 159, at
1325-28 (stating that retrospective voting models are flawed because of lack of voter knowledge about
whom to blame for policy failures); Ilya Somin & Neal Devins, Can We Make the Constitution More Demo-
cratic?, 55 DRAKE L. REv. 971 (2007); Justin Wolfers, Are Voters Rational? Evidence From Guhernatorial
Elections (Jan. 30, 2007), http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/Papers/Voterrationaliy(latest).pdf(argu-
ing that voters are only partially capable of sorting out responsibility for causes of economic growth).
165. See, e.g., Somin & Devins, supra note 164, at 979 ("Shortcuts can sometimes partially alleviate
the problem of rational ignorance. But they are not a complete solution for it . . . .").
166. Further, the development of such long-term associations inhibits the ability of local-only third
party entrants. If voters make associations on the basis of retrospective evaluation, new entrants without a
record will face an uphill climb.
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parties an advantage.' 6 7 Second, national parties are often given large finan-
cial subsidies by national governments. 6 , Most importantly, national parties
are in a strong institutional position resulting from domestic elections-the
money raised, their membership-and this makes it easy to get on the EP
ballot. In the last EP election, the major national parties in each country
contested the election.' 6 9
The presence of national parties on the EP ballot, on its own, does not
ensure that these "brands" will mean the same thing to voters in EP elec-
tions as they do in national elections. A party theoretically could attempt to
stake out a separate identity for national elections and for EP elections.
However, all evidence suggests that parties do not do that. Whereas the
primary reason why American parties do not stake out differentiated local
identities was legal; in EP elections, it seems that the issue is strategic.17o
National political parties that care more about national politics than
about the EU may get more benefit out of fighting an EP election on do-
mestic grounds than on European ones. By campaigning exclusively on na-
tional issues parties can claim victory in an important symbolic national
election, a "marker" of things to come. 17 1 Second, campaigning on Euro-
pean issues can carry a substantial cost-if the party is divided on some
European issue, fighting a campaign on European issues could create fissures
that could last until the next general national election. 172 This famously
happened in the British EP campaign of 1989, where EP campaigning
caused a rift between pro and anti-EU forces in the Conservative Party and
167. See Jurij Toplak, European Parliament Elections and the Uniform Election Procedure, 15-16, http://
www.enelsyn.gr/papers/w3/Paper%20by%20Jurij%2OToplak.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
168. See Ernest A. Chaples, Developments in Australian Election Finance, in COMPARATIVE POLITICAL
FINANCE AMONG THE DEMOCRACIES 29-40 (Herbert E. Alexander & Rei Shiratori eds., 1994); Pilar del
Castillo, Problems in Spanish Party Financing, in COMPARATIVE POLITICAL FINANCE AMONG THE DEMOC-
RACIES, supra, at 97-104; Gullan M. Gidlund, Regulation of Party Finance in Sweden, in COMPARATIVE
POLITICAL FINANCE AMONG THE DEMOCRACIES, supra, at 105-14; Ruud A. Koole, Dutch Political Parties:
Money and the Message, in COMPARATIVE POuTICAL FINANCE AMONG THE DEMOCRACIES, supra, at
115-31; Christine Landfried, Political Finance in West Germany, in COMPARATIVE POLITICAL FINANCE
AMONG THE DEMOCRACIES, supra, at 133-44.
169. Compare Results of the 2009 European Elections, supra note 102 (listing 2009 EP election results by
country by party), with PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN EUROPE, http://www.parties-and-elections.de/
countries.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2010) (showing last parliamentary election results in each European
country).
170. These strategic concerns also likely affect local elections in the United States. Political parties
may be afraid to take stances on local issues for fear of harming the national coalition. For instance,
taking a stance on some controversial education issues (e.g., the teaching of creationism) might cause
harm to unity inside major political parties that otherwise would not have had to take a stance on these
issues.
171. Oppenhuis et al., supra note 96, at 288-89. This explains a major difference between EP elec-
tions and big city local elections. In local elections, most candidates talk about local policies, even if
national politics is going to dominate voter decisionmaking. In EP elections, parties do not mention
European issues, and the difference is due to the respective candidates' desire. Local politicians-particu-
larly given the candidate-centric nature of campaigns in the United States-want to take credit for a
local mandate, as it will give them power in a local legislature. EP campaigns are waged by national
parties, and they want credit for a national political mandate.
172. See id at 290-95.
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helped bring down the Thatcher government. 173 Further, in countries where
there are strong legal limitations on the ability of parties to engage in
campaigning activities, EP elections give parties a chance to compete for
public affection on national issues. 74 There is substantial empirical evidence
that political parties do not create separate platforms in EP elections for
these reasons. 75
Moreover, it is unclear whether parties could develop separate EP identi-
ties even if they wanted to. Where parties are able to develop identities that
are separate from their national identity-for instance, Southern Democrats
for most of the twentieth century-they usually are able to do so over the
course a series of elections in which they are able to win and exercise some
power. This allows voters to develop locally-based running tallies based on
performance in office. EP elections happen only once every five years and are
the only type of pan-European election. Also, no one domestic party controls
the EP, making running tallies based on retrospective evaluations of party
performance difficult to come by. Domestic parties do not have the tools for
differentiating themselves at the European level.
EP elections do not have the high barriers to entry for pan-European or
issue specific parties that exist in American local elections.1 7 6 The absence of
these limits is why we see the flourishing of small parties in EP elections,
ranging from xenophobes to groups in favor of internet piracy.' 77 However,
these small parties still lack the track record of service through which voters
can develop a running tally and hence positive associations. 78 Thus, there
are limits to the degree to which new EP-election-only-parties can succeed.
EP voter behavior fits the model. Most voters know little about where
MEPs or Euro-parties stand or about their performance in office.17 9 Given
this, and given the existence of their national parties on the ballot, voters
rely on their existing running tallies about domestic issues. Again, in the
absence of other information, this is rational-a voter who prefers Labour in
173. See Mark Franklin & John Curtice, Britain: Opening Pandora's Box, in CHOOSING EUROPE? THE
EUROPEAN ELECTORATE AND NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE FACE OF UNION, supra note 71, at 94-95.
174. See Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, The UK's Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, in
PARTY FUNDING AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 67, at 47 (noting
time limits on Britain's campaign expenditure limit).
175. See Mark Franklin et al., Conclusions: The Electoral Connection and the Democratic Deficit, in CHOOS-
ING EUROPE? THE EUROPEAN ELECTORATE AND NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE FACE OF UNION, supra note
71, at 370-71.
176. EP elections are required to use either proportional representation or single-transferable vote,
both of which create lower barriers to entry than does a first-past-the-post single-member-district
system.
177. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
178. By their very nature, small parties do not govern, in the EP or elsewhere. As the EP does not
provide opportunities to govern either, voters do not have the ability to develop running tallies based on
their performance.
179. "[T]he media, the public and even most domestic political elites are unaware of the new politics
in Brussels. For example, few TV news editors or national MPs, let alone private citizens, realize that
political parties dominate politics in the European Parliament . HIx, WHAT'S WRONG, supra note
3, at 137.
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Britain is more likely to prefer the policies of Party of European Socialists in
the EP than those of other parties. However, voting based on domestic pref-
erences will mean that things that do not (and could not) matter to a voter's
preferences about EU policy will be reflected in the vote. For instance, the
EP elections in Britain in 2004 were largely treated by voters as a referen-
dum on Tony Blair's support for the war in Iraq, leading to losses for the
Party of European Socialists in the EP, despite the fact that most members
of that party opposed the war (and despite the fact that the EP had no power
at all over the war).'8 0
Because domestic parties are on the ballot and because voters have little
other information, voters use their preferences about domestic parties in EP
elections, even though the connection between how voters feel about domes-
tic issues and how they feel about what policies should predominate in the
EU is unclear.'""
There is one more wrinkle. For some sets of preferences, it is possible that
EP elections would look the same even if voters were very well informed. If
voters care much more about national politics, they might value the oppor-
tunity to use EP elections as a way of sending a message to domestic politi-
cians more than they care about getting policies out of the EP that they like.
However, it is unclear what public purpose is achieved by using public
funds to allow voters to express functionally meaningless preferences. Using
a non-binding poll about domestic politics as a basis for choosing officials
for a supra-national legislature is simply bizarre.18 2
More importantly, whether voters use EP elections to comment on do-
mestic politics because they are under-informed, or because they really like
sending messages to domestic governments in different ways, EP elections
180. See, e.g., Battered Blair pushes domestic agenda, TORONTO STAR (Can.), Sep. 27, 2004, at A13; John
Daniszewski & Tracy Wilkinson, Anti-EU Factions Gain in Europe Polls, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 2004, at
A3; James Kirkup, Blair Faces His Longest Week as the Numbers Add Up Nicely for Brown, SCOTSMAN (U.K.),
July 12, 2004, at 8; Andrew Rawnsley, How the Bloody Anarchy of Iraq Broke the Spirit of Tony Blair,
OBSERVER (U.K.), Feb. 28, 2010, at 32; see also Blair's Paradox, ECONOMIST, June 17, 2004, (noting that
Blair himself viewed this as the reason for Labour's poor performance in the EP elections). The EU
obviously has no control over the United Kingdom's military decisions. To the extent that any EU body
would have influence over this question, it would be through the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
which seeks to coordinate Member State foreign policies, and the European Security and Defense Policy,
neither of which the EP has any power over. See Denis Chaibi, The Foreign Policy Thread in the European
Labyrinth, 19 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 359, 363, 374-80 (2004).
181. Even if there is a high correlation between preferences about domestic policies and EU policies-
and there is likely a substantial correlation-the mismatch problem creates a lack of democratic account-
ability. First, there is some difference, as purely domestic events, like the UK Parliaments expense scan-
dal, affect the results. Further, even if candidates are chosen for their preferences on certain issues, if
voters use domestic and not international preferences, there is no retrospective accountability. MEPs may
be selected in part based on preferences that are common across domestic and EU issues, but there is no
punishment if they do not vote that way.
182. The perversion, it should be noted, is institutional, not individual. For individuals, using EU
elections to comment on domestic politics is perfectly rational. But there is no reason power should be
vested in the EP if its membership is chosen merely on the basis of messages voters want to send to their
domestic parliaments.
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do not serve the goals EU leaders set out for them. Further, it is clear that
the system of elections-the election laws and their interaction with the
state of party competition inside countries-either promotes this failure or,
at least, does nothing to ensure that EP elections serve their intended goal.
That is, the election system and the constitutional system do not promote
the same ends. There is a mismatch.
The question is whether this dynamic can be changed. The next section
will argue that it can.
B. An election law solution to the problem of mismatch in
European Parliament elections
As noted above, election law rules are never purely neutral and, instead,
structure the types of competition in elections. The clearest examples of how
election law can be used to structure politics comes from efforts to write new
constitutions for emerging democracies to deal with the problem of group
representation in ethnically divided societies. For at least the last forty years,
political scientists have been dreaming up new and more complex constitu-
tional and institutional systems designed to reduce tensions and aid demo-
cratic development.18 s Electoral systems are considered by these scholars to
be "by far the most powerful lever of constitutional engineering for accom-
modation and harmony in severely divided societies . 1.8. 4 As such, these
political scientists and political reformers propose different types of "electo-
ral engineering," different voting systems designed to alleviate the problems
faced by new democracies. 1 5 Similar forms of electoral engineering could be
used to solve the problems of EP elections.
Current EP election rules actually track one popular form of electoral en-
gineering popular in many developing countries, "consociationalism,"
which, by using proportional representation and creating multiple veto
points, ensures that policy cannot be made without widespread agreement.
This conflicts with the goal of having the EP as a direct popular check on
the Commission and Council. Using the tools of a rival school of electoral
engineering, "centripetalism," EU officials could create EP elections that
allow the EP to serve its institutional purpose.
After reviewing these two mechanisms of how election laws can be engi-
neered to achieve certain types of results, I will lay out a concrete proposal
for reforming EP elections: a requirement that, in order to receive any MEPs
from any country, a party must receive a certain percentage of the vote in
183. For a brief history of this scholarship, see BENJAMIN REILLY, DEMOCRACY IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES:
ELECTORAL ENGINEERING FOR CONFLIcr MANAGEMENT 12 (2001). Giovanni Sartori is generally consid-
ered to have pushed the creation of this subfield. See generally Giovanni Sartori, Political Development and
Political Engineering, 17 Pub. Pol'y 261 (1968).
184. Donald Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society
163 (1991).
185. See REILLY, supra note 183, at 12.
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more than seven European countries. This would force Euro-parties onto the
ballot, thereby giving rationally ignorant European voters some means by
which to connect what MEPs do to their voting decisions. It would also
encourage pan-European campaigning.
1. Electoral engineering and institutional design
The most famous efforts at electoral engineering are European in origin.
Arend Lijphart used the term "consociationalism" to describe the political
systems developed in parts of Europe as a way beyond the social cleavages
occasioned by the end of World War 11.186 Four political features character-
ize consociational democracy: proportional representation ("PR") of differ-
ent groups in the distribution of legislative seats, grand coalition
governments in which all significant groups are represented; federalism or
similar devices for dividing authority for local policies along geographic or
ethnic lines; and a power of veto over key decisions by minority groups.',,
The idea is that by giving each ethnic or social group in a country a say in
government, some degree of veto power, and control over their own affairs,
groups with generally incompatible goals and desires will buy into a govern-
ment that protects their interests. The key role is played by elites, who
represent these incompatible groups but are assumed to be able to reach
consensus inside grand coalitional governments.'"
It has been argued that the EU, like a number of European nations, effec-
tively uses a consociational model.'8 9 Moravcsik's argument that the EU
governs by consensus, with each major group or country able to effectively
veto EU policy, is basically a claim that the EU is a consociational system.190
The EP incorporates many consociational elements-for instance, control
over committees is shared among all the parties. 91 Critics of consociational-
ism make points similar to Simon Hix's criticism of the EU's brand of de-
mocracy. First, consociational arrangements have been criticized for creating
policy deadlock, as consensus is required to make policy.192 Second, elections
under consociational arrangements create centrifugal forces, in which parties
try to maximize their own group representation by emphasizing their differ-
ences with the rest of the government and country.' 93 Third, and most rele-
vantly for this study, consociational arrangements devalue representation on
186. See generally AREND .IJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES (1977).
187. See id. at 25-44; see also DONALD HOROWITz, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 569-70 (2d ed.
1985); Matthijs Bogaards, Electoral Choices for Divided Societies: Multi-Ethnic Parties and Constitueny Pooling
in Africa, 41(3) COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POL. 59 (2003).
188. See BENJAMIN REILLY, DEMOCRACY AND DIVERSITY: POLITICAL ENGINEERING IN THE ASIA-PA-
CIFIC 81, 88 (2006).
189. See Matthijs Bogaards, The Consociational Analogy of the EU: A Rejoinder to Crepaz with a Comment
on Kaiser, 3 EURO. UNION. POL. 501 (2002).
190. See supra notes 123-128 and accompanying text.
191. See Hix, WHAT'S WRONG, supra note 3, at 138-45.
192. REILLY, supra note 188, at 81.
193. See HOROWITZ, spra note 184, at 172-74.
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the basis of ideological positions in favor of representation on the basis of
group or nationality. Under consociational arrangements, the people as a
whole do not ever really have the opportunity to express clear views on na-
tional policy matters.' 9 4
Determining whether the EU as a whole is a consociational system (or
whether that is a good thing) is beyond the scope of this Article. However,
the EP was not intended to be consociational-it was supposed to provide
clear guidance about the beliefs of European voters on EU policies. The
question is whether electoral engineering can provide a tool for making the
EP achieve that goal.
Other experts have pushed an alternative theory of electoral engineering
in divided societies-centripetalism.195 Donald Horowitz notes that cen-
tripetalism's "principal tool is . . . the provision of incentives, usually electo-
ral incentives, that accord an advantage to ethnically based parties that are
willing to appeal, at the margin and usually through coalition partners of
other ethnic groups, to voters other than their own."1 9 6 Rather than divide
power among ethnic parties and strive for general consensus, which can so-
lidify the primacy of ethnic identities in politics, centripetalists seek to give
an advantage to groups that move beyond ethnic or territorial boundaries
and generate national majoritarian electoral competition along some other
axis.
One policy suggested by centripetalists is a "distribution requirement,"
or withholding any representation from candidates or parties that fail to
receive a certain percentage of the vote in a majority of provinces.197 Distri-
bution requirements are used in Nigeria, where truly national presidential
elections have been held since 1979 (albeit ones that have on several occa-
sions been overturned by military coups). 198 In Nigerian elections preceding
the Biafran War (Nigeria's civil war), voting was divided rather neatly by
party and ethnic group, with each of the nation's three major ethnic
groups-the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba and the Igbo-controlling different
territorial areas and represented by different parties.'" The Biafran War re-
sulted from this ethnic-geographic divide being the salient division in
Nigerian politics. After the war, Nigeria wanted to create a system that
disincentivized ethnic block voting.200 In the election code introduced in
1979, presidential candidates were not only required to receive a plurality of
194. See REILLY, Supra note 188, at 79-80.
195. See, e.g., id. at 83-91; Bogaards, supra note 187, at 65. The term was coined by Timothy Sisk. See
TIMOTHY D. SISK, DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE ELUSIVE SOCIAL CONTRACT 17-55 (1995).
196. Donald L. Horowitz, Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-Conflict States, 49
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1213, 1217 (2008).
197. See Bogaards, supra note 187, at 64-68, 70-71, for a full discussion of the idea.
198. Larry Diamond, Nigeria: The Uncivic Society and the Descent into Praetorianism, in PouTics rN DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES: COMPARING EXPERIENCES wmTH DEMOCRACY 417, 469 (Larry Diamond et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1995).
199. Id at 466.
200. Bogaards, supra note 187, at 70-73.
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the votes but also needed to get twenty-five percent of the vote in at least
two-thirds of the federated states.201 The first election under the system was,
at least by Nigerian standards, a success-the winning candidate, Shehu
Shagari, either met or came extremely close to meeting the regional require-
ments (and was declared to have met the requirements) running what was
the country's first truly national campaign. 20 2 Although Nigerian presiden-
tial elections since 1979 have had a large number of other problems, they
have largely consisted of competitions between candidates who have run na-
tional campaigns, not targeted local ones. 2 0 3
Two other countries use distribution requirements. Indonesia has a two-
round majority run-off system, but for a candidate to be elected in the first
round, she must not only poll an absolute majority of votes cast but also
meet a distribution requirement of twenty percent of the vote in at least half
of the provinces. 2 04 In Kenya, presidential candidates must receive at least
twenty-five percent of the vote in a minimum of five out of eight prov-
inces. 205 (Admittedly, it has been less than a success there-regional and
ethnic conflict broke out after the last Kenyan election despite the distribu-
tional requirement. 2 06 )
Regional requirements come in weaker versions as well. A large number
of countries have requirements that parties are registered and have member-
ship in a number of states in order to qualify for representation. 20 7 Romania,
an EU member state, has quite extensive registration requirements. In order
to register with the Court of Justice and to appear on the parliamentary
ballot, a party must gather at least 700 signatures in eighteen of the coun-
try's forty-two regions and must run candidates in twenty-one regions. 2 08
201. HOROWITz, supra note 184, at 184.
202. See Bogaards, supra note 187, at 70-71.
203. See id. at 70; HOROWITz, supra note 184, at 184-87; see also Peter M. Lewis, Endgame in Nigeria?
The Politics of a Failed Democratic Transition, 93 AFRICAN AFFAIRS 327 (1994) (noting that the 1989
election in particular "suggested an historic merger of northern and southern populist interests, super-
seding the ethnic faultlines which have traditionally structured Nigerian electoral politics").
204. Indonesia: Continuity, Deals and Consensus, ACE ELECTORAL KNOWLEDGE PROJEcT ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/esy/esy-id (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
205. See CONsTrrUTION, Chapter 2. Sec. 5(3f) 1998 (2001) (Kenya). For a discussion of the regional
requirements, see ELECTORAL POLITICS IN KENYA 41-42 (Ludeki Chweya ed., 2002).
206. See European Union Election Observation Mission, Kenya-Final Report General Elections 27 De-
cember 2007 (April 3, 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/external-relations/human-righs/electionobservation/
kenya.2007/final-report-en.pdf.
207. Ten countries have regional distribution requirements for political parties running in national
elections for the lower representative chamber, and three countries-India, Nigeria, and Romania-
have regional distribution requirements for political parties running in national elections for the upper
representative chamber. For example, in Turkey, where there are eighty-one provinces, a qualifying party
has to be fully organized in at least half of the provinces and one-third of the districts within these
provinces. The ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data: What are the Registration Require-
ments for Political Parties Running for National Elections (Chamber 1)?, http://aceprojecr.org/epic-en/CDMap
?question=pcO01 (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
208. See Vera Stojarovd, Jakub Sedo, Lubomfr Kopecek & Roman Chytilek, Political Parties in Central
and Eastern Europe: In Search of Consolidation, Central and Eastern Europe Regional Report, 62-63 (2007),
http://www.idea.int/publications/pp-c-and_e_europe/upload/RegionalReportCEE.pdf
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There is even a regional requirement in the EU's law on Euro-parties. In
order to qualify for an EU grant, a party on the European level must "be
represented, in at least one quarter of Member States, by [MEPs} or in the
national Parliaments or regional Parliaments or in the regional assemblies,
or it must have received, in at least one quarter of the Member States, at
least three per cent of the votes cast in each of those Member States at the
most recent European Parliament elections." 2 09 These requirements apply to
the domestic parties that join together to support a single Euro-party.
Eleven separate parties received EU funding by meeting these targets in
2005 .210
2. Using distribution requirements to reduce the mismatch problem in
European Parliament elections
The basic logic of Nigeria's presidential voting system, and the Euro-
party funding system, could be applied to EP elections. EP elections all use
proportional representation or single transferable vote. 2 11 Proportional repre-
sentation systems usually have a "threshold" requirement. 2 12 A party must
receive a certain percentage of the vote in order to receive any seats. For
instance, in German elections, a party must receive at least five percent of
the vote to receive any representation in the national parliament, the
Bundestag. 2 13
The EU could require parties to meet a Europe-wide threshold as well as
one in any given country. 2 14 For instance, using the existing rules for fund-
ing Euro-parties, the EU could pass legislation that stated that, in order to
receive any seats from any country in the EP, a party must receive directly at
least three percent of the votes cast in a quarter of the member states. The
Euro-parties could not, however, count votes for domestic parties that are
allied together towards meeting this requirement. The Labour Party would
209. Commission Regulation 2004/2003, On the Regulations Governing Political Parties at Euro-
pean Level and the Rules Regarding Their Funding, 2003 O.J. (L 297) 1.
210. The amounts and the recipients of money under Commission Regulation 2004/2003 for 2005
are available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/tenders/subventions 2005.htm (last visited Nov. 6,
2010).
211. See Toplak, supra note 167, at 16. Under a single transferrable vote system, voters rank order
candidates, and the candidate with the lowest number of first-place votes gets eliminated, and all the
votes that went to her are then "transferred" to the candidate ranked second on the voters ballot. This
process continues until there is a single winner (if there is more than one seat in the district, then the
process becomes a bit more complicated, as votes from candidates who have hit the necessary amount also
have to be transferred). Daniel R. Ortiz, Note: Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawful At-Large
Systems, 92 YALE L.J. 144, 150 & n.30 (1982).
212. See Michael Gallagher, Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds,
Paradoxes and Majorities, 22 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 469, 485 (1992).
213. Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government: Why Professor Ackerman is Wrong to
Prefer the German to the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 51, 62 (2001).
214. I have only seen one reference to a similar idea. Mark Franklin, Cees van der Eijk and Michael
Marsh, although supportive of pan-European ideological competition, dismiss the possibility of such a
legal requirement as not "practical." Franklin et al., supra note 175, at 379. They do not explain why
they think it is not practical, though.
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not receive any EP seats in the UK unless it also won-under its own ban-
ner-three percent of the vote in eight European countries. 2 15
All major European parties are purely domestic. None would be able to
win any percentage of the vote in another country. As the domestic parties
would be unable to win EP seats on their own, they would be forced to put
the Euro-party names on the ballot. Voters in the UK, thus, would not see a
ballot consisting of candidates from Labour, the Conservatives, the Liberal
Democrats, the United Kingdom Independence Party and other domestic
parties, but would instead see the Euro-parties: the Party of European So-
cialists, the European People's Party, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats
for Europe and the Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (and four
others as well).
The immediate effect of this regulation on who runs for a seat as an MEP
would be small. Nothing about the rule would require national political
parties to lose the power to appoint candidates, nor would it reduce the
influence of domestic parties inside the Euro-parties. 2 16 Efforts to enhance
the power of the Euro-parties have traditionally focused on their funding
and their organizational independence from domestic parties and from legis-
lative groups in the EP.2 17 However, these are the wrong tools. Rather than
focusing on the institutional apparatuses of parties and candidates, the EU
should make the names of Euro-parties available to voters on EP ballots.
Instead of trying to change the behavior of elite politicians, this change
would directly affect what voters know. And lack of voter knowledge is the
main problem of EP elections.
Putting the Euro-parties on the ballot would have the effect of giving
voters a more accurate heuristic about MEP voting practices. They could
track the voting behavior of both members of the Euro-parties from their
country, and from others, in the running tally style. The ability to use run-
ning tally decision making should help alleviate the problem caused by the
fact that voters lack much direct information about EP policies. After all,
many voters at all levels of government do not closely follow government
policymaking: parties and party labels give them the tools to render
whatever observations they do have into useful votes. Parties that accurately
215. If this rule was in place in 2009 and all current Euro-party groups got the same vote as their
constituent domestic parties received in 2009, each of the eight Euro-party groups would have received
representation. The European Conservatives and Reformists group is the only party that would have
come close to missing the mark, having received over three percent in exactly eight countries. See Results
of the 2009 European Elections, supra note 102 (examining results by country and party).
216. Ernest Young argues that one of the main protections of the powers of Member States is the
absence of representative democracy in the EU. See Young, supra note 7, at 1705. The lack of program-
matic parties, he claims, makes the EU less legitimate and hence less likely to take power from Member
States. This may be true, although it is equally true of other things that would contribute to the EU's
legitimacy, like conducting policy well. However, some degree of competition for legitimacy is built into
the EU system, and this reform-if it worked-would only introduce that type of competition to the
level envisioned by the EU's existing treaties.
217. See generally Day & Shaw, supra note 67, at 295-320.
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reflect the choices made by EP politicians could help voters overcome their
lack of knowledge about politics.
However, as the salience of EP issues is lower than domestic issues, the
effect of having responsive parties at the EP might be small, particularly at
first. Voters may well just equate the Euro-party with its domestic partner.
However, this is unlikely to last over time. As voters would be able to make
connections between Euro-party performance and their voting decisions, at
least some voters would develop opinions about them-independent of their
opinions about the domestic performance of their partner party. The Euro-
parties themselves would have incentives to build their brand names. When-
ever their domestic partners were unpopular, they could turn to pan-Euro-
pean appeals in order to rally support.
The basic models we use to understand voting decision-like Fiorina's
running tally model-suggest that the existence of a heuristic on the ballot
will lead to its use by voters. Further, even if the effect is small and only a
few voters develop preferences about Euro-parties that are distinct from their
preferences about national parties, this would still be significant. Party con-
trol of the EP is usually quite close, and even a small Europe-wide shift
could change that balance in overall EP elections. 2 18
Further, there is at least some evidence that voters can successfully track
two separate party systems. For instance, cities in both British Columbia
and Quebec, Canada, have elections with entirely different parties than exist
at the national or even the provincial level. In Vancouver, the Non-Partisan
Alliance contests elections against the Vision Vancouver and the Committee
For Progressive Electors.2 1 9 In Montreal, Vision Montreal, Union Montreal
and Projet Montreal compete. 22 0 These parties have no national or provincial
analogue (although there are ties between some local parties and provincial
and national parties), but nevertheless create intense local partisan
competition. 22 1
Having Euro-parties on the ballot would also encourage campaigning on
EU issues. Domestic parties that thought they could be successful in EP
elections by bringing up European issues, but were worried that doing so
might prove harmful later in domestic elections, would face changed incen-
tives. Because the blame-or the credit-would go to the parties running
and not necessarily to the domestic party, parties would have to worry less
about "blowback" in later domestic elections. Similarly, it would reduce
218. No party has ever had fifty percent of the seats in EP necessary to organize it. Nor has any
combination of two parties aside from the two major parties, the PES and EPP. See DEMOCRATIC POLr
ics, supra note 4, at 24-26.
219. Justine Hunter, Vision Prevails in Landslide Victory, GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.), Nov. 17, 2008, at
S2; Greg Joyce, Voters Heading to Polls in B.C. Municipal Elections, PORTAGE DAIY GRAPHIC (Can.), Nov.
18, 2005, at 9; See Why Vancouver Works, MACLEAN'S (Can.), July 27, 2009, at 2.
220. See generally Martin Patriquin, Montreal is a Disaster, MACLEAN's (Can.), Nov. 9, 2009.
221. Id
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domestic party incentives to campaign on domestic issues, as the credit (or
blame) would not run to them for winning or losing.
The change would likely limit beggar-thy-neighbor campaigning. There
is currently no check on the desirability of making nationalistic claims in EP
elections, and parties sometimes claim that they will choose policies that
will disproportionately help their home country (even though left-right
politics determines MEPs voting patterns far more than nationality). Parties
can make these claims because they are not held accountable for them in
other countries. If the Euro-parties appeared on the ballot, parties that run
exclusively on their ability to get more money for one country theoretically
could be held accountable by the press or other parties in other countries.
Candidates in the United States often use famous figures from other states in
their campaigns (e.g. Republicans from the South using Nancy Pelosi in
their campaign ads). Although this effect does not eliminate claims that
candidates will bring home pork, it certainly limits more aggressive versions
of regional campaigning. A distribution requirement may serve the same
function in EP elections.
Finally, the proposal would also limit the ability of otherwise informed
voters to use the EP ballot to comment on domestic politics. 22 2 A vote
against the Party of European Socialists would not be read as clearly as a
comment on domestic politics as, say, a vote against the Labour Party. The
diminished utility of the EP vote as a method of commenting on domestic
politics would lead to the diminished use of it among informed voters. This
reform would thus make EU issues more prominent in EP voting decisions
among both informed and uninformed voters.
The proposal would have costs, as well. All thresholds, like the rule that a
party must receive five percent of the vote to receive any seats in the
Bundestag in Germany, serve to exclude certain groups with real support
from winning seats. This rule would serve to exclude holders of certain
viewpoints from the EP, in this case ideas that are not pan-European. Fur-
ther, it would result in a certain number of wasted votes. 223 If the rule
proves too strict and excludes too many groups with real support, this result
222. One of the major critiques of the Fiorina model is that political party identification is more
likely to be determined by tribal-like personal identification rather than by assessment of possible policy
outcomes. See GREEN ET AL., supra note 164, at 8-11. To the extent that this is correct, the suggested
reform will be particularly attractive as there will be no group on the ballot with which to identify,
voters will have to make an assessment of policies in order to determine whom to vote for and not merely
rely on their group identification.
223. In an important contribution to this discussion, Richard Pildes has called for constitutional
arrangements with time limits. Richard H. Pildes, Ethnic Identity and Democratic Institutions: A Dynamic
Perspective, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES: INTEGRATION OR AccommODATION?
173, 185-88 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2008). He argues that consociational arrangements may be important
at the outset of new democracies, but that a move to centripetal laws is often good. He suggests, follow-
ing the example of the South African Constitution, that centripetal arrangements be given a time limit
to phase out, allowing their replacement (and avoiding their calcification) with policies designed to
create post-ethnic societies. Id. A similar idea might be useful in EP elections, although in the opposite
direction.
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could be mitigated by making the rule temporary, lasting only a few elec-
tion cycles until pan-European parties are developed, or by reducing the
threshold for the number of states in which a party needs to win seats.
However it is implemented, a distribution requirement would have the
effect of making EP elections serve their intended purpose in the EU's insti-
tutional structure. That is, they would give voters the ability to use EP
elections to provide feedback about EU issues. Notably, it would do so with-
out undermining or changing the basic structure of the EU. Member states
would still have representation in the Council, and that would still be done
on the basis of domestic election results, which would remain unaffected by
this legislative change. If the reform worked, and voters were able to sepa-
rate their commitment to a domestic party from their beliefs about what the
EU should do, the EU's current system of the separation of powers could be
preserved. Even if it did not work as intended, it would still serve to limit
beggar-thy-neighbor campaigning in EP elections.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE MISMATCH PROBLEM IN AMERICA AND EUROPE
The problems of EP elections are not unique. They look a great deal like
the problems of American local elections, only in reverse. 224 Whereas in big
American cities, national party preference determines the vote for local office
with little reference to local performance or conditions, in EP elections, na-
tional party preference determines the vote for a supranational legislature
with little reference to the performance of politicians at the supranational
level. Both American local governments and the EP fail to reflect the prefer-
ences of voters about the issues these entities decide.
Further, the goals of having elections for these offices and the repeated
practices of voters are in tension. 22 5 Just as EU leaders decided to have direct
224. Local elections in Europe are generally second-order, although less so than EP elections. See
Anthony Heath, lain McLean, Bridget Taylor & John Curtice, Between First and Second Order: A Comparison
of Voting Behaviour in European and Local Elections in Britain, 35 EUR. J. POL. REs. 389 (1999).
225. In an interesting new essay, Paul Edelman argues that the "institutional dimension" of electoral
design is extremely understudied. See Paul H. Edelman, 'And the Oscar goes to. . .'The Academy Awards and
the Institutional Dimension of Election Design (Vand. L. & Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 9-23, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1456529. Edelman argues "that elec-
tions are about more than just preference aggregation. Elections are organized by institutions, and those
institutions may have interests that are distinct from the preferences of voters." Instead, vote counting
systems can achieve specific institutional goals, like higher ratings for the Oscars. Further, his analysis of
vote counting systems in democracies shows that the methodology for tabulating preferences will neces-
sarily involve different institutional goals and theoretical ideas about what constitutes a democratic re-
sult. Rather than thinking of particular election methods-proportional representation, first-past-the-
post, instant run-off, etc-as better or worse than others, they should be analyzed by how well they
achieve specific institutional goals, of which accurate tallying of pre-existing preferences is important,
but by no means the only value. Edelman's argument has much in common with Samuel Issacharoffs
brilliant work on election law in transitional constitutional orders. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile
Democracies, 120 HARv. L. REv. 1405 (2007) (examining how election law rules can, in different institu-
tional settings, create different incentives, and why democracies at different levels of security might make
different decisions on rules governing elections). This Article argues that EP vote counting system should
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elections for EP in order to have direct voter comment on EU policies,
American states presumably decided to hold local elections in order to en-
sure that cities are governed according to the preferences of local people
about local policies. In both cases, the fact that national party preference
determines voting results undermines these constitutional intentions.
The clear lesson from both American local elections and EP elections is
that a constitutional or institutional structure that calls for elections for a
type of public office will not necessarily result in the type of political com-
petition that the constitutional framers wanted. This is largely a product of
rational voter ignorance. Voters are asked to provide their opinions on how a
body should be governed, but they individually have little incentive to de-
velop these opinions. Absent the proper tools to overcome their rational
ignorance along the proper dimensions, allocations of power to elected enti-
ties often will not achieve constitutional ends.
In modern elections, the most relevant tool voters have for overcoming
their ignorance of politics is the heuristic provided by a political party. In
national elections, this works well. When people vote for a unitary national
parliament or a national president, political parties provide clear signals
about the policy proclivities and past responsibility for policies. Further, in
these major elections, voters pay sufficient attention-or at least some vot-
ers, although certainly not all-and can develop independent preferences
about candidates and their policy proposals. 22 6
In other types of elections, though, the party heuristic is effectively the
only tool voters have, and it is not necessarily a particularly useful one. If
political party competition does not produce a relevant heuristic along the
same dimension as the issues the official or legislative body decides, or the
goals the framers had for the body, the goals of the constitutional system
will likely not be met. That is, there will be a "mismatch" between consti-
tutional or institutional goals and electoral reality.
Both American local elections and EP elections fall into the mismatch
trap. But they are not the only examples. For instance, Heather Gerken has
shown that a similar dynamic occurs in elections for secretary of state and
other officials at the state and local level. 22 7 In most states and many locali-
ties, the officials that decide how to run elections-which voting machines
to use, where to locate voting booths, how to organize a recount, etc.-are
elected themselves, but the same combination of voter ignorance and the
availability of party heuristics that determines the results in local elections
makes decisionmaking in these elections purely partisan.2 28 Voters, bereft of
attempt to fit the institutional interests expressed in the treaties establishing the EU and its separation of
powers.
226. This is why some big city mayoral general elections are competitive. See Schleicher, City Council
Elections, supra note 31, at 445-47.
227. See HEATHER GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX 15-26 (2009).
228. Id.
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information about the actual performance of secretaries of state as election
administrators, make decisions exclusively on the basis of which official is
most likely to help out their preferred candidates in other elections. Thus,
there is no real competition to make election administration better, which is
presumably why states require elections for these offices in the first place.
Mismatch problems frequently occur in situations where there are nested
elections, or where individual voters are asked to make choices about offi-
cials at a number of different levels of government. The reasons why such
problems occur have been laid out above-EP elections, American big city
local elections, and secretary of state elections all have similar characteristics.
However, it is not necessarily the case that nested elections will develop
mismatch problems. To the extent that national political parties can develop
distinct local identities (or international ones, for the purposes of EP elec-
tions), there can be ordinary Downsian competition. Further, if mainstream
independent local parties can be established, they can create competition.
Also, if candidates can become well known enough, that too can introduce
competition, something we see when prominent gubernatorial candidates
are able to win elections in states where their party does not do well. Finally,
to the extent preferences on national issues track closely preferences on
whatever the body decides, the lack of competition becomes a less costly
problem. 22 9
However, nested elections will create mismatch problems if the political
parties that contest local (or international) elections are national in scope,
the individual candidates are not particularly well-known, and preferences
about local (or international) issues do not track national preferences very
closely. Where this occurs-and it occurs frequently-merely holding local,
state or supra-national elections is not the same thing as getting public in-
put on local, state or supra-national policies. Absent competition along these
dimensions, there is little reason to believe that such elections produce rep-
resentative results or retrospective accountability.
Finally, mismatch problems are not limited to nested elections. Mismatch
problems can occur between entities at one level of government. Daryl Lev-
inson and Rick Pildes have shown that the intention of the framers of the
U.S. Constitution that Congress checks the power and ambition of the Presi-
dent does not occur during periods of one-party governance. 230 One reason
for this is how congressional elections operate. 23 1 A member of Congress will
not get any electoral benefit from checking the power of the President if the
President is likely to define the popularity of that member's political party.
229. Even in this situation, these elections may have the problem of not providing much of a check on
abuse by officials, as corrupt officials can continue in office by function of maintaining support from their
major party and from voters who vote the party line.
230. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2311, 2315 (2006).
231. See id at 2323-24.
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Limiting the power of the President from her own party will also often make
it harder for a member of Congress to achieve specific policy goals or provide
local benefits that help him or her electorally. 232
Examining mismatch problems together provides a benefit, as they sug-
gest a menu of options to respond to mismatch problems. The scholarship
has identified three possible solutions for mismatch problems. First, my
work on American urban elections and this Article suggest electoral engi-
neering solutions. States could pass laws barring national parties from con-
testing local elections, or at least removing the limitations on developing
distinct local identities, with the goal of developing locally-meaningful par-
ties and party heuristics. 233 The EU, as is suggested in Part III.B of this
Article, could pass laws that require parties to get votes in multiple coun-
tries, forcing the development of pan-European parties and party heuristics.
Second, Gerken suggests an alternative, less intrusive response: the devel-
opment of an alternative heuristic. For instance, she argues that private
groups, with the aid of the national government, should develop a ranking
system, a Democracy Index, that would rank state electoral systems along
widely-agreed upon metrics, like time spent waiting to vote or lost bal-
lots. 234 Among other benefits, this would give voters a clear, easy-to-under-
stand heuristic when they vote for secretaries of state.235 This would provide
voters with the ability to achieve the ends behind having secretary of state
elections.
Lastly, on the other side of the ledger, Levinson and Pildes suggest chang-
ing institutional arrangements. If Congress does not check the President
during periods of one-party rule because majority party members have no
incentive to do so, the minority party in Congress should be given certain
powers-like the power to investigate-so there is a check on the Presi-
dent.2 36 Further, supermajority rules and increased judicial skepticism of
laws passed during one-party governance might be justified to ensure a
healthy check on presidential power.237 These institutional arrangements in-
corporate an understanding of the incentives of elected officials given how
voters actually make voting decisions. Rather than seeking to make politics
fit institutional goals, they seek to make institutions fit political reality.
This is, in many ways, the opposite response to a similar type of problem.
It is not clear what type of response will be best in any given mismatch
problem, whether it will be best to change institutions or types of political
competition. Little is known about how any of these possible responses
would do, as they are largely untried. However, it is clear that, to the extent
232. Id. at 2323-27; see also Daryl Levinson, Empire Building, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 936-41
(2005).
233. See Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 31, at 468-73.
234. GERKEN, supra note 227, at 5-6, 26-37.
235. Id. at 66-80.
236. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 230, at 2368-71.
237. See id. at 2372-75.
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we care whether our constitutions work, we need to think about how elected
institutions interact with political party competition and poorly informed
voters.
The view of election law in this Article is somewhat different from the
form it takes in most of the scholarship on the subject. Election law scholars
have grown used to studying things like ballot access rules and questions of
internal party governance in a variety of ways-to see whether these are
ways for incumbent politicians to entrench themselves or for one political
faction to gain advantage over another, how they affect specific political
rights, or even to see what they say about broader questions about the mean-
ing of representation in a democratic polity. 23 8 These are, of course, impor-
tant ways of looking at these policies, crucial to assessing the quality of these
rules and how they should be reviewed by courts or independent bodies.
However, here the focus is on something different: how election rules
provide information to a bored and disinterested populace. 239 The work of
scholars like Fiorina shows that the content of a nation's election laws (e.g.
the availability of party heuristics on the ballot) is essential to the process of
how voters develop preferences.240 When voters base their decisions on
which policies will be enacted by the officials for whom they vote, even if
only partially or imperfectly, it results in better democratic outcomes under
virtually all possible theories of what democracy is supposed to accomplish.
However, the ability of rationally under-informed voters to do this relies on
the availability of clear, consistent, office-relevant heuristics and political
markets will only sometimes and under some conditions provide them. The
social value of such heuristics is higher than their cost. Rather than serving
as a tool for deciding which type of representation voters should get, or as a
weapon for incumbent politicians, election law in this view is a public
good. 24 ' It is up to the bodies that regulate elections to ensure that these
public goods are provided and provided properly.
238. See generally Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 601, 604
(2007); Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way For the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach, 106
COLUM. L. REv. 708, 748-49 (2006).
239. Saying that election laws have a major effect on how voters form preferences is a very different
thing from saying that election campaigns do. James Gardner has recently written an excellent book
attacking the notion that much persuasion happens during campaigns, and noting that much political
discourse (and legal thinking) that is built around the idea that campaigns are true deliberative debates is
flawed. See JAMEs A. GARDNER, WHAT ARE CAMPAIGNS FOR? THE ROLE OF PERSUASION IN ELECTION
LAW AND POLITICS 1-7 (2009). However, this does not address whether the laws that structure politics
give voters tools that allow them to develop informed opinions. For instance, election law rules are
crucial to ensuring that parties are consistent in their ideological positions over time. Decisions like Duke
v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996), in which the Republican Party was allowed to expel David
Duke for ideological apostasy, give political parties greater control over their own ideological brand.
Parties that are consistent ideologically over time allow voters to develop useful running tallies based on
retrospective evaluations of how politicians behave while in office. The legal rule is hence relevant to the
voting decision. However, none of this requires that anything happens during an election campaign.
240. See supra notes 161-163 and accompanying text.
241. A public good is traditionally defined as a good that is both non-rivalrous and non-excludable.
In other words, the consumption of the good by one person does not bar consumption of the good by
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Looking at election laws as public goods allows us to see the difference
between the investment we put in democratic governance and the demands
our Constitution (and state constitutions and the EU's institutional struc-
ture) puts on voters. If our constitutional systems are to achieve their visions
of self-governance, the public good of election law needs to be provided in a
way that respects the limitations of the selves who are asked to do the gov-
erning. Otherwise, we will be left with legislatures and officials who win
elections for reasons entirely unrelated to their performance and with consti-
tutions that do not work. That is to say, we will be left with the problem of
mismatch.
another person, and no one can be barred from using the good. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky,
Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1, 9 (2003). Public goods are underprovided by markets
because the producers of the good do not capture the full benefits of consumption of the good. Id. at
9-11. Information is generally considered to be the purest of all public goods. Id. at 11. Relevant heuris-
tics for a level of government are exactly the types of public goods that are underprovided by political
markets-they are valuable to voters, but not necessarily in ways that translate into votes for the parties
that would bear the cost of developing them. See id. at 14-17.
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